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ABSTRACT 
Title: Is There a Link Between Risk Management and Company Value? 
Seminar date: 2013-06-03  
Course: BUSN89, Degree Project Master level, Business Administration, Master level, 
15 University Credits Points (UPC) or ECTS-credits. 
Authors: Johan Engström & Carolina Niveman  
Supervisor: Anders Vilhelmsson 
Key words: Risk Management, Company Value, Tobin’s q, Risk Management 
Disclosure, Regression Analysis. 
Purpose: This research aims to investigate whether there is a relationship between the 
use, measured by the disclosure, of risk management in large Swedish corporations 
and the companies’ relative value, measured by Tobin’s q. Our goal is that this study 
will contribute to the already existing but ambiguous research.  
Methodology: Quantitative, deductive approach with multiple regression analysis.  
Theoretical Perspectives: The theoretical perspective gives the reader insight to risk 
management in general and how it can be value creating. This is followed by earlier 
empirical research regarding the specific question.  
Empirical Foundation: The research includes a sample of 52 companies that are all 
listed on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm, Large cap. We find that there are large variations 
in the data sample. The individual coefficients in the regression analyses are 
insignificant to describe variations in q. However both the complete models, 
including control variables are significant. 
Conclusions: The study cannot conclude whether or not risk management increases 
company value. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is an introduction to the study presented in this report. A short background 
about risk management, the problem discussion, question of issue, purpose and the 
motivation behind the report will be presented in this part. In the end of the section the 
study’s limitations will be determined as well as its disposition and target audience group. 
1.1 Background 
The principle behind financial risk management is the practice of using financial 
instruments to reduce the company’s exposure to financial risks. These instruments 
should protect the company against financial risks that can occur due to future 
uncertainties. Common to all types of risk management activities is that the most 
essential part is the identification and measurement of the risks a company faces. 
(Horcher, 2005) 
 
What can be observed from the literature regarding risk management is that its 
importance and popularity has steadily increased, in particular during the last two 
decades. Companies have started to realize that to be a competitive player it is no 
longer enough to have the most advanced technology, cheapest labor or the best 
marketing. Macroeconomic factors such as fluctuations in exchange rates, 
commodity prices and interest rates can have a large impact on a company’s financial 
performance. (Horcher, 2005) 
 
The reason behind the popularity increase can be attributed to various factors. First 
of all, companies around the world are operating in an increasingly international 
environment following the continuous globalization. Companies today have the 
ability to exploit many new opportunities but they also face larger risks, such as 
political risks, foreign exchange risks and limited information. Further, factors as 
foreign exchange rates, interest rates, commodity and securities prices have become 
more volatile. (Schroeck, 2002) 
 
As the globalization will continue, it will become even more important for companies 
to be able to protect themselves against these risks. Risk management can be seen as 
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strategically meaningful for companies and will help them to reach and ensure 
business and operational goals, performance, results and long-term survival. (Swerma, 
2013) When the financial crisis hit the world in 2008, it became even clearer how 
different markets are interdependent and the attention on financial risk management 
has never been as high as now. 
1.2 Problem Discussion 
As Miller and Modigliani (1961, 1958) imply, under the assumption that a market is 
without imperfections, the use of risk management is irrelevant. This since the 
market participants easily can diversify their portfolio and thereby replace the risk 
management activities executed by the companies. Risk management only leads to 
safer investments and thereby a lower return that creates no additional value for the 
investors. 
 
Other research within the area claims that risk management should have the potential 
to increase company value. Myers (1977) and Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) 
argue that risk management can reduce the costs associated to the conflict among 
equity and debt holders. Smith and Stulz (1985) imply that risk management can be 
value adding in the sense of lower cost of financial distress. Graham and Smith 
(1999) argue that the convex tax curve is an incentive for risk management. Although 
these studies contribute to theoretical incentives behind risk management - they lack 
empirical evidence. 
 
The first paper to actually investigate whether there is any correlation between risk 
management and company value was made by Allayannis and Weston (2001). The 
report implies that companies that use risk management can enjoy a value premium 
of close to 5%. Following this study, the interest to investigate the relationship has 
increased and researchers have contributed with additional findings. Common to 
many of these studies are however that they tend to have a specific focus and thereby 
it is hard to apply the results more generally. 
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One issue that is frequent for all previous studies that investigate the subject is 
derived from the way to measure risk management. Many researchers, including 
Allayannis and Weston (2001), measure the use of risk management in absolute 
terms, either a company uses risk management or they do not. The problem with this 
method is that it oversees the relative value of the use of risk management. 
 
As a reaction to financial crises and large scandals, the attention regarding companies’ 
requirements to disclose their risk management practices has increased. The 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) provides, in chapter 7, 
requirements of how companies are mandatory to report their work with financial 
instruments. This give rise to the belief that a company’s risk management work 
should somehow be reflected by the disclosure in their annual reports and hence it 
could be used as a proxy for measuring the use of risk management. 
 
Based on the discussion presented above, we conclude that the existing research 
regarding the topic is incomplete. This applies both when it comes to the method 
used for measuring the use of risk management and research done on the Swedish 
market. This study will therefore try to broaden the existing evidence by using a new 
measurement method as well as applying it on companies’ primary listed on Nasdaq 
OMX Stockholm, Large Cap. 
1.3 Question of Issue 
 
• Is there any relation between risk management and company value? 
 
1.4 Purpose 
This research aims to investigate whether there is a relationship between the use, 
measured by the disclosure, of risk management in large Swedish corporations and 
the companies’ relative value, measured by Tobin’s q. Our goal is that this study will 
contribute to the already existing but ambiguous research.  
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1.5 Limitations 
We limit the study to cover Swedish corporations registered on Nasdaq OMX 
Stockholm, Large cap. We will only measure the relative company value with Tobin’s 
q and not any further methods. The study will cover one year and risk management 
will only be measured in quantitative terms, not by qualitative research.  
1.6 Target Group 
This study is primarily aimed to researchers and university students with prerequisite 
knowledge corresponding to Master level. The intention is also that other people will 
find the report interesting, especially people working with risk management. 
1.7 Disposition 
 
Figure 1.1 – Overview of disposition 
 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
This chapter is an introduction to the study presented in this report. A short 
background about risk management, the problem discussion, question of issue, 
purpose and the motivation behind the report will be presented in this part. In the 
end of the section the study’s limitations will be determined as well as its disposition 
and target audience group 
 
Chapter 2 – Theoretical Framework 
This chapter gives a short introduction to the concept of financial risk management 
followed by its fundamentals. Further, theories of value creating and non-value 
creating risk management are presented. The chapter ends with a section on earlier 
research within the specific area. 
 
 
 
Introduc)on	   Theory	   Methodology	   Empirical	  Findings	   Analyis	   Conclusion	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Chapter 3 - Methodology 
The coming section outline the study’s approach used to answer the question of 
issue. The chapter describes what scientific methods have been used for collecting 
data and analyze the empirical results. The methodology section ends with a critical 
reflection of how chosen sources of information affect the quality of the study. 
 
Chapter 4 - Empirical Findings 
This chapter starts by presenting some descriptive statistics for our sample. This is 
followed by a presentation of the results from the data tests and findings from the 
regression analysis. The chapter is concluded with a description of how to interpret 
the results.  
 
Chapter 5 - Analysis 
This chapter put the empirical results together with theory. First we present a 
discussion around the measurement of risk management. This is followed by an 
analysis of the coefficients and the complete regression models. The chapter ends 
with a critical examination of the results and evaluates the validity of the selected 
proxy of risk management usage.  
 
Chapter 6 - Conclusion  
This section presents the theoretical and empirical conclusions that have been 
discussed in the analysis. The chapter ends with suggestions to further research 
within the same empirical and theoretical field 
 
Chapter 7 – References  
In this section the references used are presented in alphabetical order. 
 
Appendix 
The appendix contains full lists and tables of, companies, search words and data used. 
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2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter gives a short introduction to the concept of financial risk management 
followed by its fundamentals. Further, theories of value creating and non-value creating 
risk management are presented. The chapter ends with a section on earlier research within 
the specific area. 
2.1 Financial Risk Management 
The concept of financial risk management addresses the problems that arise due to 
future uncertainties on the financial markets. When managing a company, it is 
important to be able to make decisions about which risks to be considered acceptable 
and which risks that are considered too high for the company to bear. The decision 
not to hedge at all implies that a company accepts all risks by default. (Horcher, 
2005) 
 
Companies can use a variety of strategies that include different products in their 
effort to protect themselves against future financial uncertainties. For these products 
to be effective, they require a management that is well aware of both the 
characteristics of the company’s risks as well as the characteristics of the products they 
use. It is also important that the use of these products reflect the company’s 
objectives in question of risk tolerance (Froot, Scharfstein & Stein, 1994). 
 
The most commonly used type of risk management strategy involves certain types of 
derivatives. The price of the derivative is a reflection of the value of the underlying 
asset (Smithson, Smith, & Wilford, 1995). Derivatives are usually categorized into 
two types, forward-based and option-based. The distinction between these two is that 
the option-based derivatives have values that are linear in the price of the underlying 
asset and have a maximum loss known by the trader. Forward-based derivatives 
instead have unlimited liabilities. (Culp, 2001) 
2.2 Fundamentals Behind Risk Management  
The striving goal for a company with an active risk management policy must be that 
the risk management activities should result in a higher company value. Froot (1994) 
describes this as if hedging activities cannot add company value then the company 
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should not pursue hedging. Since the value of a company could be seen as a reflection 
of the present value of future cash flows, the fundamental behind value creation is 
derived from the simple argument that hedging activities must either increase cash 
flows or decrease the discount rate (Schroeck, 2002). There are also analysts who 
argue that the use of risk management can be a strategic weapon. This is based on the 
notion that market participants tend to experience risks higher than they actually are, 
and punish companies disproportionately because of that. (Damodaran, 1997) 
 
Literature as well as earlier research within the corporate finance field differs on 
whether it is possible for risk management to add value to the company or not. 
Theories also differ in the way they describe the utilization of risk management 
advantages. 
2.3 The Irrelevance of Risk Management Decisions  
The most basic theories behind risk management seem to suggest that the use of 
instruments to mitigate financial risks cannot be value adding for the company’s 
shareholders. 
 
The irrelevance of risk management and why it does not create company value is 
derived from different perspectives. First, according to the proposition made by 
Miller and Modigliani (1958), decisions made within the corporate finance field 
cannot add company value in a perfect market since its shareholders can easily 
replicate by hedging themselves (Aretz & Bartram, 2010). The second perspective 
argues that the Net Present Value (NPV) of an unhedged company is the same as the 
hedged company’s NPV, since fairly priced derivatives cannot have any impact on 
expected value (Culp, 2001).  
2.3.1 Miller and Modigliani  
Miller and Modigliani (1958, 1961) base their theory on four assumptions.  
1. Perfect capital markets 
2. Symmetric information 
3. Given investment strategies 
4. Equal access to remain in force 
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These assumptions imply important results that are of great relevance for decisions 
within financial risk management. The implications are presented in the following 
section.  
 
The irrelevance of capital structure implies that the value of a company is not affected 
by the company’s leverage. The profit of an investment will always be the same, 
independently of whether it is financed with debt or equity. Miller and Modigliani 
describes this in their Proposition I as: If an investor stands in front of the decision to 
buy shares in either the levered company A or the unlevered company B, the investor 
can always buy shares in B and then borrow the same relative amount that is in 
company A. This means that the potential return will always be the same for the two 
investments. (Fama, 1978) 
 
Miller and Modigliani (1958) describe irrelevance of debt and leverage in their 
Proposition II as: A company’s cost of capital is unaffected by the amount of leverage 
even though debt appears to be a cheaper source of finance. This comes from equity 
holders’ increased expected return as a function of investing in a company that bears 
more debt and by that is more risky.  
 
The indifference of security holders cannot really be accepted by just assuming the 
aforementioned assumptions. The four Miller and Modigliani assumptions can only 
guarantee that the company itself is independent of its security holders but not that 
its security holders are independent. To be able to accept this statement, additional 
assumptions are required. 
5. Assigned seniority to existing debt holders  
6. Early retirement of debt should begin with the most junior issuers 
If including these assumptions the company’s security holders also become 
indifferent of its financing decisions. (Culp, 2001) 
 
The last implication, the irrelevance of hedging and insurance, states that a company’s 
value is not only independent of the company’s capital structure but also by actions 
taken to control risks. This can be trough hedging and insurance. If all shareholders 
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hold perfectly diversified portfolios, then the impact of a company that starts to 
hedge will possibly ruin the investors ‘own’ hedge instead of increasing the company 
value. (Fama, 1978) 
 
It is important to understand that investors might simply choose to invest in a 
particular company due to the exposure to a specific risk. It can be that the investor 
holds a negatively correlated stock so that the effect of a possible downturn in the 
stock price will be reduced when it comes to the investor’s wealth.  
 
This comes down to the argument, underlying the Miller and Modigliani 
propositions, that whether or not the investors hold portfolios that are perfectly 
correlated, they are indifferent to risk management decisions. (Culp, 2001) 
2.3.2 Equilibrium Asset Price  
The concept behind this theory states the basic precept that you get what you pay 
for. In a world that is free from arbitrage opportunities and where its inhabitants 
prefer more to less, the equilibrium price of all assets will always be reflected by the 
risk that the assets bear. This theory includes all types of assets, such as stocks, bonds, 
forwards, futures, swaps and options etc. If all investors are compensated for the risk 
they have by holding a specific asset, it must lead to the conclusion that risk 
management cannot be value adding (Copeland & Weston, 1988).  
 
There are many famous researchers within finance that have tried to come up with 
the right asset pricing model that will be able to both discount risky assets in the 
absence of arbitrage and in equilibrium. The model with most recognition is the 
single-factor Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). What the model does is expressing 
the return of an asset as a linear function with respect to a combination of risk 
factors. According to the model, the only thing that matters is the systematic risk. 
The unsystematic risk can instead be diversified away by the investors. Dufey and 
Srinivasulu (1983) emphasize the fact that, according to CAPM, the only thing that 
happens when entering into a contract is moving along the security market line, thus 
no value is created. 
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Although CAPM is the most well known model, there are many other models that do 
not use a stochastic discount variable that is not linear but instead try to identify 
discount factors directly. What they all have in common is that they show the 
relationship that the price of an asset equals the discounted expected present value on 
the cash flows on that specific asset assuming perfect capital markets. (Culp, 2001)  
2.3.3 Theories Behind Value-Adding Risk Management 
This section will bring up theories behind how risk management can create 
additional value for companies. As Miller and Modigliani show in their propositions, 
risk management cannot be value adding in a perfect market. This implies that 
increased company value can arise from risk management that utilizes the capital 
market imperfections. Shareholders would then not be able to perfectly replicate the 
risk management activities of the company. Several theories exist on how risk 
management can be beneficial and most of these arise from violations to Miller and 
Modigliani assumptions. They can also be associated back to the conception made by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) of a company as a nexus of contracts. Existing literature 
use several ways of describing theories behind value creating risk management. Three 
main areas where risk management can be value adding are identified and will be 
described in the following section.  
 
1. Reducing transaction costs 
2. Reducing agency costs 
3. Reducing taxes and market imperfections  
 
2.4 Reducing Costs as a Rationale for Risk Management 
2.4.1 Costs of Financial Distress and Bankruptcy 
One of the most widespread reasons for companies to manage risks might be the 
attempt to mitigate the risk for financial explosions that can result in financial 
distress and even bankruptcy. Companies cause these kinds of situations when their 
cash flows are not sufficient to cover payment obligations on time. Larger portion of 
leverage and more volatile cash flows make companies more vulnerable to this risk. 
Although risk management can reduce the likelihood of default, it is not by that, the 
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value is created. Instead, the increased value is connected to the reduced agency and 
transaction costs. (Smith & Stulz, 1985) 
 
In a situation of bankruptcy, both creditors and shareholders look to recover as large 
parts as possible of their investments by their claims on the residual value of the 
company. Often this is a process that ends up in a costly dispute (Warner, 1977a). 
Due to the Miller and Modigliani assumptions, risk management would however not 
have any impacts. If transaction costs did not exist, a bankruptcy would be costless 
and only result in proportional asset redistribution to the company’s liability holders 
(Culp, 2001).  
 
Warner (1977b) revealed that there are relatively small costs that are directly 
connected to a bankruptcy, 1% to 3% of shareholder value. Instead much of the 
costs are indirect costs. According to Cutler and Summers (1988) these costs 
corresponds to 20% of shareholder value and occurs when suppliers and customers 
expect near future insolvency and require premiums to engage in transactions with 
the company. 
 
When a company uses risk management it reduces the volatility of the company’s 
cash flows, which mitigate the likelihood of default and thus lower the expected cost 
of financial distress. Lower expected costs of financial distress result in increased 
company value (Stulz, 2003, 1996). This can be described with the following two 
formulas:  
 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦  𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦  𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡  𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠                                                  −𝑃𝑉 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙  𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠  𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠  
Formula 2.1 – Company value 
 𝐸 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙  𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠  𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏. 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 ×  𝐸(𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡  𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠) 
Formula 2.2 – Expected financial distress costs 
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Given what is stated above, that risk management can lower the cost of future 
financial distress, it must be more value adding for companies with high leverage and 
hence more payment obligations to get engage in risk management activities 
(Tufano, 1996). 
As an additional advantage, by increase the use of risk management, the company 
will be able to take on more debt and enjoy better use of their tax shield, which also 
leads to increased company value (Graham & Rogers, 2002).  
2.4.2 Agency Costs as a Rationale For Risk Management 
In a Miller and Modigliani world, with symmetric information, given investment 
decisions, and equal access to remain in force, the value of risk management 
regarding contractual relations would be zero. (Aretz & Bartram, 2010) 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) see a company as a set of contracts between different 
parties, such as, managers, creditors, shareholders and employers that have different 
interest, which can cause costly conflicts. It can be that managers who are more 
involved in the company’s activities have an information advantage over its 
shareholders and that these two parties do not share the same interests.  
 
Since the conflicts among the different parties give rise to agency costs, which hence 
cause a reduction of company value, the value of risk management lies in the 
reduction of these costs. (Schroeck, 2002)  
2.4.2.1 Managers and Security Holders 
The conflict between managers and security holders can often be derived to two 
different problems, the overinvestment problem and the risk preference problem. 
 
Managerial discretion and hence the overinvestment problem becomes particularly 
relevant for a company with a large amount of free cash flows (Jensen, 1986). Agency 
costs arise when equity holders have to control managers’ behavior so they do not 
spend free cash flow on non-value creating activities such as empire building or 
unnecessary benefits (Jensen, 1986). This problem increases when the managerial 
ownership in the company is low. One way to prevent these problems is by active 
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monitoring. Since shareholders usually do not have incentives to engage in that kind 
of monitoring, it is not a very effective mechanism. (Aretz & Bartram, 2010) By 
using risk management, the volatility of free cash flows will be limited and result in 
fewer opportunities for managerial discretion (Tufano, 1998). A company that uses 
risk management may also be a more attractive investment for an undiversified 
investor who wants to hold a large stake. This in turn results in a more concentrated 
ownership followed by increased incentives for monitoring and thus higher cash 
flows (Stulz, 2003).  
 
The risk preference problem is a foundation based on the problem that arises due to 
managerial risk aversion. Managers use to have a relatively undiversified wealth 
position with their welfare strongly connected to the company. This leads to 
managers becoming very risk averse, alternatively demand a higher compensation. 
None of which are in line with shareholders best interests (Stulz 1990, 1984). Risk 
management will result in a less volatile company and thereby a lower probability of 
default. This would in turn mean a lower compensation needed by the managers 
(DeMarzo & Duffie, 1995). An additional potential is that corporate hedging might 
increase company value by preventing managers to spend money on expensive 
diversification strategies (Bodnar, Tang & Weintrop, 1997).  
2.4.2.2 Conflicts Among Security Holders 
Conflicts between security holders and managers can give rise to value creating risk 
management. As will be shown in this section, there are also opportunities to 
implement risk management due to conflicts among security holders. These conflicts 
can be divided into the asset substitution problem and the underinvestment problem. 
Both problems arise due to the likelihood of default when a company to some extent 
is financed with debt, which clearly brings benefits due to the tax shield. (Culp, 
2001) 
 
The asset substitution problem arise due to the fact that shareholders have a residual 
claim and incentives to switch from projects with low variance, which was agreed to 
the bondholders, to high variance projects (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This behavior 
results in increased value of shareholders’ claims but at the same time reduced value 
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of bondholders’ fixed claims. Not only will this behavior reduce the value of 
bondholders’ claims, it also often results in reduced value of the company as a whole. 
(Schroeck, 2002) 
 
The value destroying costs arise since rational debt holders will understand that this 
problem might occur, and because of that, either require higher premiums or want to 
pay a lower bond price. It is also likely that bondholders try to prevent this from 
happening by writing strict covenants or issuing convertible debt. The consequences 
of this can lead to a suboptimal investment policy and reduce the company’s needed 
flexibility and hence increasing the agency cost of debt. (Stulz, 1999) 
 
With risk management, companies will be able to decrease the costs arising from the 
asset substitution problem by lowering the cash flow volatility. Less volatile cash flows 
increase the debt capacity without increasing the risk of default, hence risk shifting 
would be less of an issue. By reducing the probability of default, the bond price or 
coupon rate would decrease since the investment becomes less risky. (Schroeck, 
2002) 
 
The underinvestment problem addresses the risk that managers might reject positive 
NPV projects when the profit will primary accrue to the bondholders. To prevent 
this problem, costly negotiations and debt contracts are often needed. One way to 
reduce problems associated with underinvestment is to reduce the amount of debt 
outstanding, but this would instead lead to a reduction of the tax shield. (Smith, 
Smithson & Wilford, 1990) 
 
When a company uses risk management, it reduces the volatility of the company’s 
cash flows and by that, makes it less likely to default on their obligations. A company 
with a lower risk of default has fewer costs associated with underinvestment conflicts 
since the payments to debt holders are safer with less volatile cash flows. The 
consequence of safer payments to debt holders also reduces the incentives for 
managers to skip positive NPV project and hence increases company value. (Smith, 
1995; Smith et al., 1990) 
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2.4.3 Taxes and Other Market Imperfections  
2.4.3.1 Taxes  
Due to Miller and Modigliani, the value of a company is a linear function of assets 
and liabilities. One of the strongest assumptions is perfect capital markets and 
nonexistence of institutional frictions, which includes corporate taxes. This means, 
for tax reasons, it would not matter if a company decided to hedge or not. (Culp, 
2001) 
 
Smith and Stulz (1985), Bartram (2000), Santomero (1995), Mayers and Smith 
(1990), Smith et al. (1990) argue that the structure of tax code can make it beneficial 
for a company to use hedging instruments such as futures, forwards and options. 
This since the effective marginal tax rate is an increasing function of a company’s pre-
tax value. This means that the after-tax value is a concave function of the pre-tax 
value. The consequences of this implies that if hedging can reduce the volatility in 
the pre-tax value of the company, it would lead to reduced corporate tax liabilities 
and by an increased after-tax value of the company.  
Figure 2.1 – Effects of convex tax schedule on l iabil it ies. Source: Schroeck, 
2002 (Adapted from Smithson et al. (1995), p. 104.) 
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As figure 2.1 and 2.2 shows, if hedging can reduce the pre-tax value volatility of the 
company, then the company’s expected tax liability will fall, which leads to an 
increase in the expected after-tax value of the company. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 – Effects of convex tax schedule on income. Source: Schroeck, 2002 
(Adapted from Smithson et al. (1995), p. 104.) 
 
The level of convexity that a company faces is often due to statutory progressivity, 
but as Mayers and Smith (1990) imply, statutory progressivity is relatively limited in 
most tax systems. Aretz and Bartram (2010) also highlight the indirect effects that 
might result in a more convex tax function, which can come from special tax 
preference items. The consequences of this imply that companies with larger 
amounts of income in the convex region of the tax curve or with a large amount of 
special tax items would benefit more from hedging. Aretz and Bartram (2010) 
emphasize the fact that companies facing low tax rates can benefit more from the 
convexity since the tax schedules in most countries apply a curve that is convex up to 
the a certain level and then becomes linear. Corporations in Sweden face a fixed tax 
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rate that has been changed from time to time. In 2011 the tax rate was 26.3%. 
(Ekonomifakta, 2013) 
2.4.3.2 Other Market Imperfections  
In addition to what have been mentioned, other market imperfections can be a 
reason for companies to engage in risk management to increase company value. 
 
Dividend Policy: Since dividends tend to have signal effects, companies like to have 
stable dividend payouts. Companies are worried about future volatility in cash flows 
and the fact that they can be forced to reduce the dividend payouts. When managers 
get too much free cash flow, there is a risk that they will invest in negative NPV 
projects, which in turn leads to value destruction. With risk management, the cash 
flows will be more stable and result in managers taking on less value destroying 
projects. (Damodaran, 1997) 
 
Perceived risk: This imperfection is based on the notion that market participants have 
a tendency to experience risks higher than they actually are. This in turn leads to a 
market that punishes companies with higher risks disproportionately. (Schroeck, 
2002) 
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2.4.4 Summary of Value Creating Risk Management 
Theory	  Summary	  
Reduce	  
Transaction	  Costs	  
Costs	  connected	  to	  the	  probability	  of	  future	  bankruptcy	  
makes	  it	  rationale	  for	  companies	  to	  engage	  in	  risk	  
management	  since	  it	  will	  lower	  their	  cash	  flow	  volatility	  
and	  hence	  the	  risk	  of	  default.	  
Reduce	  Agency	  
Costs	  
Conflicts	  Between	  Managers	  and	  Security	  Holders	  
The	  monitoring	  costs	  of	  managerial	  discretion	  will	  be	  
reduced	  since	  the	  conflict	  between	  managers	  and	  security	  
holders	  will	  be	  lowered	  with	  reduced	  free	  cash	  flows.	  The	  
cost	  of	  managerial	  risk	  aversion	  will	  be	  lowered	  since	  the	  
fluctuation	  in	  company	  value	  will	  be	  reduced.	  
Reduce	  Agency	  
Costs	  
Conflicts	  Among	  Security	  Holders	  
Risk	  management	  will	  reduce	  free	  cash	  flows	  and	  due	  to	  
that,	  the	  costs	  that	  arise	  because	  of	  conflicts	  between	  
shareholders	  and	  debt	  holders.	  The	  savings	  can	  often	  be	  
traced	  to	  a	  reduction	  of	  the	  underinvestment	  problem	  
and	  the	  asset	  substitution	  problem.	  
Reduce	  Taxes	  and	  
Other	  Market	  
Imperfections	  
Regimes	  with	  convex	  tax	  curves	  make	  it	  rationale	  for	  
companies	  to	  engage	  in	  risk	  management	  since	  it	  will	  
lower	  their	  tax	  burden	  due	  to	  reduced	  volatility	  of	  the	  
companies’	  pre-­‐tax	  income.	  Dividend	  policy	  and	  perceived	  
risk	  also	  make	  it	  rational	  to	  engage	  in	  risk	  management.	  
Table 2.1 – Summary of theories behind value creating risk management 
2.5 Earlier Research 
Due to most of the theories described above, risk management has the capacity to 
increase company value. The question is if the reality matches the theories. This part 
brings up previous research that has focused on the particular question ‘Does risk 
management creates additional company value?’ 
 
Even though risk management has been used for many years, the question on 
whether it is value creating or not came into focus relatively recently. Allayannis and 
Weston (2001) aimed to examine the direct relation between company value and 
hedging. 720 large, non-financial companies are studied between 1990 and 1995. 
Tobin’s q measures the companies’ values and their hedging activities are measured in 
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absolute terms, either they hedge or not. They find significant results that the market 
values of companies that engage in hedging activities are on average 4.87% higher 
than for companies that do not use hedging instruments. 
 
Although this contribution is of economical importance it should not be taken as 
obvious evidences. Guay and Kothari (2003) conclude that corporate derivative 
positions are in general not sufficient to account for an increased value of 4.87% as 
suggested by Allayannis and Weston (2001). Guay and Kothari instead argue that the 
existing correlation between company value and the use of derivatives stem from the 
tendency that successful companies use derivatives to a greater extent.  
 
Graham and Rogers (2002) studied 442 companies within different sectors, showing 
the potential of derivatives to increase company value by an average of 1.1%. This 
increase is assigned to companies’ capabilities to take on more debt due to the tax 
shield. Nain (2004) show that companies that decide to use financial derivatives in 
hedging intensive sectors have a 5% higher Tobin’s q compared to companies without 
hedging activities.  
 
Regarding the relation between risk management and commodity price hedging, a 
few studies have been made. Smithson and Simkins (2005) consolidate these studies 
with the result that none of them show a positive relation between commodity 
hedging and equity value. The results either show no relation or negative effects. 
Smithson and Simkins bring up the most important paper by Jin and Jorion (2004), 
who studied 119 oil and gas producers based in the U.S. between 1998-2001. The 
outcome of the study is that even though hedging activities can reduce the exposure 
to fluctuations in oil and gas price, it does not result in increased company value. The 
authors also conclude, that investors may decide to invest in oil producers with the 
aim to gain the exposure to oil the price. If this is the case, a company that starts to 
hedge will reduce the investors’ exposure to the oil price against their will.  
 
Allayannis, Lel and Miller (2011) find that companies with strong engagement in 
internal corporate governance tend to have a higher company value. The study 
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enhances the important aspect, that for risk management to result in a high-risk 
premium, it is of great importance to have a strong presence of corporate governance.  
 
Clark and Judge (2009) indicate that different kinds of hedging instruments could 
increase company value in a range between 11-34%. The result shows that foreign 
exchange derivative strategies contribute with an average value premium of 14%, but 
debt-based strategies do not contribute with any significant value creation. The 
average result, including all hedging strategies, is that hedging increases company 
value by 12%. This is well above the results found by Allayannis and Weston (2001) 
as well as Nain (2004). 
2.5.1 Risk management transparency 
In addition to the findings above, and due to our selected method of measuring risk 
management, it is of relevance to mention empirical findings regarding increased 
transparency and value creation. These theories are based on the fact that increased 
transparency will reduce information asymmetry. But like many other theories, they 
often fail to provide real evidence. Muller and Verschoor (2008) were the first ones 
to investigate whether the disclosure of risk management can show any positive 
relation to company value. They find no strong correlation between risk management 
disclosure and company value.  
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3 METHODOLOGY 
The coming section outline the study’s approach used to answer the question of issue. The 
chapter describes what scientific methods have been used for collecting data and analyze 
the empirical results. The methodology section ends with a critical reflection of how chosen 
sources of information affect the quality of the study. 
3.1 Selection of Approach  
This study has a quantitative approach in collection of data since it is more suitable 
and in a better way will answer the question of issue. The results are dependent on 
large amounts of data, which is better and more correctly obtained by a quantitative 
examination rather than a qualitative approach.  
 
As the study is based on previous empirical findings and literature it has an approach 
that is deductive. Since the results should reflect the reality and not be biased with 
our thoughts and experiences, information has been collected without any 
expectations. Empirical data is primary collected from a sample of Swedish 
companies’ annual reports and Thomson Reuters DataStream.  
3.2 Primary and Secondary Data 
The data used in this study is solely secondary and retrieved from annual reports, 
databases, relevant literature and earlier research. These documents are the basis to 
answer the study’s questions of issue. Scientific articles have been used to access 
results from earlier research within the specific area. No interviews or other primary 
collection of data have been conducted.  
3.3 Selection of Sample 
We choose to do the study on the Swedish market, on companies that have their 
primary listing on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm, Large Cap. The criteria for a listing on 
Large Cap is that the company has a market capitalization over 1 billion EUR 
(Nasdaq OMX, 2012). We exclude Autoliv, Lundin Mining Corporation, and Stora 
Enso since OMX Stockholm is not their primary listing. BillerudKorsnäs is as of 
today one company, in 2011 Billerud was a separate entity and thereby the company 
included in this survey is Billerud. Castellum is excluded due to lack of data in 
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Thomson Reuters DataStream. Banks (Swedbank, SEB, Nordea and Svenska 
Handelsbanken) are excluded from the study due to their special assets structure. The 
complete list of companies included in the study can be found in Appendix A. 
 
The study is conducted on the Swedish market because Sweden is one of few 
countries in Europe that still have their own currency. Many of the companies listed 
on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm, Large Cap also have large scale of import and export. 
The combination of international operations and the fact that Sweden has its own 
currency makes Swedish corporations exposed to several macroeconomic factors such 
as volatile exchange rates, fluctuating interest rates and commodity price risks. The 
above arguments give rise to the consideration that Swedish companies should have 
significant incentives to engage in risk management and hence it is an interesting 
market to study.  
3.4 Laws of Risk Management Disclosure  
As the study applies an approach where risk management is measured as a proxy of 
risk management disclosure it is important to understand the restrictions that 
companies have, regarding risk management disclosure. It also enhances the 
arguments for the study’s selected approach regarding the measurement of risk 
management.  
 
The Swedish stock exchange operates under IFRS. Since all companies in the sample 
are registered on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm, they are required to follow these 
standards. IFRS 7 (Financial Instruments: Disclosure) brings up the requirements 
regarding disclosure of financial instruments and hence the hedging activities.  
 
According to IFRS 7, which is a complement to International Accounting Standards 
32 (IAS 32), companies are required to disclose their risk exposure. This should be 
done at such level so that the reader of the financial statements has the possibility to 
evaluate the nature and extent of the risks that the company is facing. The focus of 
the disclosure should be on the risks that financial instruments give rise to and how 
these instruments are managed. The types of financial instruments should be divided 
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into groups that are suitable due to the characteristic and nature of the instruments. 
(Deloitte, n.d.) 
 
All companies are required to do both quantitative and qualitative disclosure. Risks 
that are most often included, but not limited to, are: liquidity risk, market risk and 
credit risk. Table 3.1 shows a summary over what should be disclosed with regards to 
IFRS paragraphs 7.33 and 7.34. (Deloitte, n.d.) 
 
IFRS	  7,	  Requirements	  of	  Quantitative	  and	  Qualitative	  Risk	  Disclosure	  	  
Paragraph	   Regulation	  
Issue	  
Disclosure	  requirements	  
7.33	   Qualitative	  
Disclosures	  
All	  type	  of	  risks	  that	  arise	  due	  to	  use	  of	  financial	  
instruments	  should	  be	  disclosed	  by	  the	  entity.	  This	  
includes	  a	  description	  of	  the	  risk	  exposure	  and	  how	  
it	  arises,	  it	  also	  includes	  the	  objectives,	  policies	  and	  
processes	  for	  managing	  the	  risk	  and	  methods	  used	  
to	  measure	  the	  risk.	  
7.34	   Quantitative	  
Disclosures	  
All	  types	  of	  risks	  that	  arise	  due	  to	  use	  of	  financial	  
instruments	  should	  be	  disclosed	  by	  the	  entity.	  This	  
includes	  a	  summary	  of	  quantitative	  data	  about	  its	  
exposure.	  
Table 3.1 – Summary of risk disclosure IFRS 7 
3.5 Measuring the Use of Risk Management 
The risk management concept can be considered slightly vague and there are no clear 
directions of what is included in the concept. The fact that different companies use 
different approaches makes it difficult to measure. Most researchers including, 
Allayannis and Weston (2001), measure the use of risk management by categorizing 
the companies as users or non-users. This can however oversee important aspects 
when it comes to the degree of risk management. 
 
The measurement of risk management in this study is based on how much the 
selected companies emphasize risk management in their annual reports. The result 
from this measurement is used as a proxy for determining how much risk 
management the selected companies’ use. IFRS 7 require companies to communicate 
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their risk management activities to their shareholders: We assume that the level of 
risk management should be reflected in the selected companies annual reports, hence 
the more risk management the company uses, the more it should be emphasized in 
the annual report. 
 
A list of risk management related word and combinations of word has been 
developed and matched to the different companies’ annual reports, a computer 
program1 does the matching. The results rendered in this scan are used as a proxy to 
estimate the grade of risk management used by the companies. 
 
To get a ‘hit’ in the annual report, the standalone words needs to be mentioned as 
they are in the list. For the combination of words the program will only return a ‘hit’ 
if the complete combination is located within ±200 characters, independently of 
order of the words. The complete list of words and combinations of words can be 
found in Appendix B.  
 
The results from the scan of the annual reports are consolidated in two forms, 
number of ‘individual hits’ (RMI) and number of ‘total hits’ (RMT). See the 
following section for an explanation of the two.  
3.5.1 Explanation of RMI and RMT 
RMI, every word or combination of words is just counted once, regardless of how 
many times it is mentioned in the annual report, i.e. if risk is found twenty times in 
one annual report it is just counted once. 
 
RMT, every word and combination of words is counted as many times as they appear 
in the annual report, i.e. if risk is mentioned twenty times it is counted twenty times. 
 
By using a large amount of risk management related words we have tried to capture 
all the different ways that the companies might use to mediate their risk management 
activities.  
                                                   
1   Thanks to Anders Vilhelmsson, Associate Professor, Department of Business 
Administration, Lund University.  
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3.6 Selection of Words 
The words that have been selected as risk management related words have carefully 
been picked referring to literature, annual reports and laws of disclosure. All the 
selected words and combination of words have characteristics of usually being 
connected to risk management. Our measure of risk management is somewhat 
unique although it builds on previous work by Desender (2007), Hoyt and 
Liebenberg (2011). 
3.7 Collection of Data 
The data is mainly collected from Thomson Reuters DataStream, some data is found 
in the different companies’ annual reports. We have collected static series from 2011-
12-31 and all numbers expressed in currencies are in SEK. The data is cross-sectional 
since it is not time series data. The reason for conducting the survey on 2011 is 
because there is a lag in reporting of accounting data. 
3.7.1 Definitions of Data  
The following section describes the definitions from Thomson Reuters DataStream 
for the various types of data collected. Tables with complete data can be found in 
appendix C. 
 
CAPEX: Funds used to acquire fixed assets other than those associated 
with acquisitions. 
 
Common Equity: Common shareholders’ investments in the company. 
 
Current Assets:  Cash and other assets that are reasonably expected to be 
realized in cash, sold or consumed within one year or one 
operating cycle. 
 
Current Liabilities:  Debt or other obligations that the company expects to satisfy 
within one year. 
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Dividend Paid: Total and common dividends paid to shareholders. (Used to 
create dummy variable) 
 
International Sales: Revenues generated from operations in other countries than 
Sweden. (Used to create dummy variable) 
 
Long-Term Debt: All interest bearing financial obligations, excluding amounts 
due within one year. It is shown net of premium or discount. 
 
Market Capitalization: Market Price at year-end × Common Shares Outstanding.  
 
Revenues: Gross sales and other operating revenue less discounts, returns 
and allowances. 
 
Total Assets: The sum of total current assets, long term receivables, 
investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, 
net property plant and equipment and other assets. 
3.8 Tobin’s q 
Tobin’s q was introduced by Brainard and Tobin (1968), the q-ratio is a measure of a 
company’s market value and the replacement cost of its assets. The model was 
originally developed to predict investment decisions. To exemplify, if a company has 
a q between 1 and 0 that means that the replacement costs of the company’s assets 
are greater than the value of the company’s stock, hence the implication that the 
stock is undervalued. If on the other hand the company has a higher q than 1, this 
implies that the company’s stocks are valued higher than the replacement cost of its’ 
assets, hence the stock is overvalued.  
 
The q-ratio is a measurement that will work as a proxy for company value from an 
investor’s perspective (Wolfe & Sauaia, 2003). Since it is a ratio it makes the q of one 
company comparable to the q of another company. Tobin’s q is used because unlike 
other measures of performance, it does not require risk adjustment (Lang & Stulz, 
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1994). Tobin’s q also reflects the market expectations and is relatively free from 
managerial manipulation (Lindenberg & Ross, 1981). 
 
The original formula for Tobin’s q requires complicated calculations and complex 
data that are out of the scope of this study. We use a simplified approximation of 
Tobin’s q, introduced by Chung & Pruitt (1994), which renders a 96.6 % 
approximation of the original formula for Tobin’s q. 
 𝑞 = 𝑀𝑉𝐸 + 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑇𝐴  
Formula 3.1 – Tobin’s q 
 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 =    𝐴𝑉𝐶𝐿 − 𝐴𝑉𝐶𝐴 + 𝐴𝑉𝐿𝑇𝐷 
Formula 3.2 – DEBT 
 
Where: 
MVE = Market value of equity, i.e. stock price * outstanding shares 
TA = Accounting value of the company’s total assets 
AVCL = Accounting value of the company’s current liabilities 
AVCA = Accounting value of the company’s current assets 
AVLTD = Accounting value of the company’s long term debt 
3.9 Multiple Regression Analysis 
To determine if there is any relation between risk management and company value 
we conduct a multiple regression analysis using Eviews 7. The analysis is performed 
with the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) methodology and accordingly to the 
equations presented in section 3.9.2. 
3.9.1 OLS Estimation - Assumptions 
When conducting a multiple regression analysis there are some assumptions that are 
made for the explanatory variables in order for the model to return reliable 
coefficients (Dougherty, 2011). The regressions are tested using a variety of tests to 
see if the estimations are reliable. 
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A1 The model is linear in parameters and correctly specified; this means that each 
variable on the right side of the equations presented in section 3.9.2 includes a 
unique β coefficient and there is no correlation between the βs. (Dougherty, 2011) 
 
A2 There does not exist an exact linear relationship among the regressors in the sample; 
for the model to explain any variations in q the explanatory variables (A-G) must 
have a variance that is ≠ zero. (Dougherty, 2011) 
 
A3 The disturbance term (u) has zero expectation; the expected value of u is zero, the 
disturbance term can vary and be both positive and negative but should not have a 
systematic tendency in any direction. (Dougherty, 2011)	  
 
A4 The disturbance term (u) is homoscedastic; we assume that the disturbance term is 
homoscedastic, if we have heteroscedasticity in the disturbance term the coefficients 
returned in the regression will be inefficient. (Dougherty, 2011) 
 
A5 The disturbance term (u) has a normal distribution; the disturbance term is 
assumed to be normally distributed. (Dougherty, 2011) 
3.9.2 Regression Equations 
The two models for our regression analysis are as follows:  
 ln 𝑞 =   𝛼 + 𝛽!𝑅𝑀𝐼 + 𝛽!𝐴 + 𝛽!𝐵 + 𝛽!𝐶 + 𝛽!𝐷 + 𝛽!𝐸 + 𝛽!𝐹 + 𝛽!𝐺 + 𝑢 
Formula 3.3 – Regression equation, RMI 
 ln 𝑞 =   𝛼 + 𝛽!𝑅𝑀𝑇 + 𝛽!𝐴 + 𝛽!𝐵 + 𝛽!𝐶 + 𝛽!𝐷 + 𝛽!𝐸 + 𝛽!𝐹 + 𝛽!𝐺 + 𝑢 
Formula 3.4 – Regression equation, RMT 
 
We have performed our test with two different data series representing the use and 
disclosure of risk management. See aforementioned section 3.5.1 for an explanation 
of RMI and RMT. 
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3.9.3 Dependent Variable 
The natural log of Tobin’s q is set as the dependent variable in the regression analysis, 
this enables us to interpret the coefficients in terms of percentage change. 
3.9.4 Independent Variables 
RMI and RMT, which represent the use of risk management, are set as the 
independent variables in combination with the control variables explained in section 
3.9.5. 
3.9.5 Control Variables 
To make sure we are measuring the effect of risk management on company value we 
are measuring, we need to exclude the impact of other variables on our results. To do 
this we have included several control variables in the regression analysis. Below 
follows a description of the control variables and why they are included. 
 
A. Size: Peltzman (1977) argues that size leads to higher efficiency and 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) argues that larger companies’ are more likely 
to use risk management due to large start-up costs of hedging. To account for 
this we have a control variable that is set as the natural log of total assets. 
B. Access to financial markets: Companies that uses risk management may forgo 
investment opportunities because of difficulties to obtain financing for these 
projects, if they only undertake positive NPV project their q will remain high. 
This is accounted for by a dividend dummy which is set to 1 if the company 
paid a dividend in 2011, and zero otherwise. If the company paid a dividend 
they are less likely to be financially constraint and therefore we expect the 
dividend dummy to be negatively related to Tobin’s q. (Allayannis & Weston, 
2001) 
C. Leverage: A company’s capital structure may have an impact on its’ value. 
(Allayannis & Weston, 2001) We adjust for this by including a control 
variable that is defined as long-term debt divided by common equity. 
D. Profitability: More profitable companies are likely to trade at higher premium 
then less profitable companies. If companies that use risk management are 
more profitable this will result in their q being higher. To control for this we 
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use return on assets defined as revenues to total assets. (Allayannis & Weston, 
2011) 
E. Investment growth: Myers (1977) argue that company value also depends on 
the company’s investment opportunities. Froot et al. (1993) argue that a 
company that uses risk management will also have greater investment 
opportunities’. Following these two argumentations we control for the effect 
of investment opportunities in our results by using a control variable that is a 
ratio of CAPEX to revenues.  
F. Industrial diversification: Lang and Stulz (1994) present empirical evidence 
that industrial diversification is negatively related to company value. To 
compensate for this effect we will use a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the 
company is active in more than one segment of the industry and zero 
otherwise.  
G. Geographical diversification: Morck and Yeung (1991) find that 
multinationality is positively related to company value. To account for this 
effect we use a dummy that is set to 1 if the company has revenues from 
international sales, and zero otherwise. 
3.10  Criticism 
3.10.1 Reliability and Validity  
The reliability in this study can be attributed to two dimensions. First of all, the 
reliability of the data that has been collected from different sources, particularly 
Thomson Reuters DataStream and the companies’ annual reports. These sources are 
widely used and well scanned and why they can be considered reliable. The second 
dimension is the reliability of methods that have been used to collect data. Since the 
methods are highly dependent on computer programs, the risk for human mistakes is 
minimal and the reliability of the result can be considered high.  
 
Regarding the validity in this study it can be divided in two different aspects, the 
measurement of company value and the measurement of risk management. Tobin’s q 
as a proxy for company value is widely used and a proven method, and can because of 
this be considered to have a high validity. On the other hand, the measurement of 
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risk management as a function of risk management disclosure can be questioned. 
Since this study is the first of its kind using this method, there are no other studies 
that we can benchmark with. The question is if the disclosure has a correlation to the 
actual risk management activities conducted by the companies or if the only thing 
that is measured is the disclosure. The validity can due to this be questionable and 
needs further investigation. 
3.10.2 Replicability 
All the data is found in Thomson Reuters DataStream and in the companies’ annual 
reports. You could simulate the scan conducted by the computer program by 
manually checking the annual reports and end up with the same result as the 
program generates. Since all data is available and well described the study has a high 
degree of replicability. 
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4 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
This chapter starts by presenting some descriptive statistics for our sample. This is followed 
by a presentation of the results from the data tests and findings from the regression 
analysis. The chapter is concluded with a description of how to interpret the results.  
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Here we present the descriptive statistics over our data sample. Tables with full data 
series can be found in Appendix C. In December 2011 there were a total of 79 
securities from 59 different companies listed on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm, Large 
Cap. 20 of the companies listed, had two classes of securities actively traded. There 
are four banks that will, as aforementioned, be excluded. There are three companies 
that do not have their primary listing in Stockholm (Lundin Mining, Autoliv and 
Stora Enso) these are excluded as well along with Castellum due to lack of data in 
Thomson Reuters DataStream. This results in 52 companies being included in the 
study. The currency unit used is Swedish crowns (SEK).  
 
As seen in table 4.1 there are large variations in the data material regarding the 
accounting numbers for the companies in the sample. Total assets (TA) vary from 
1.6 billion to 352 billion. Volvo, which has the largest amount of debt, has around 
84 billion whilst H&M and Axis do not have any debt at all.  
	   TA	   CE	   LTD	   Revenues	   CAPEX	  
Mean	   68	  034	  078	   30	  075	  414	   12	  401	  249	   50	  800	  123	   2	  515	  985	  
Median	   37	  296	  000	   14	  978	  500	   7	  630	  800	   26	  075	  000	   982	  900	  
Max	   352	  083	  137	   159	  492	  646	   84	  287	  000	   310	  367	  000	   17	  394	  000	  
Min	   1	  617	  800	   -­‐1	  601	  000	   0	   408	  000	   0	  
Std.	  Dev.	   84	  425	  333	   39	  157	  205	   16	  496	  759	   67	  312	  676	   3	  442	  606	  
Obs.	   52	   52	   52	   52	   52	  
	   CL	   CA	   Mkt.	  Cap.	   Int.	  Sales	   Div.	  Paid	  
Mean	   19	  892	  910	   24	  063	  669	   62	  641	  038	   40	  714	  302	   2	  752	  973	  
Median	   8	  618	  000	   10	  522	  067	   25	  787	  172	   16	  609	  852	   817	  000	  
Max	   153	  210	  000	   198	  816	  000	   409	  614	  552	   296	  259	  000	   24	  921	  624	  
Min	   8	  000	   11	  000	   6	  032	  187	   0	   0	  
Std.	  Dev.	   31	  596	  223	   41	  076	  931	   88	  322	  301	   60	  865	  314	   4	  636	  862	  
Obs.	   52	   52	   52	   52	   52	  
Table 4.1 – Descriptive statistics accounting data 
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Variables A-G in table 4.2 are the control variables described in section 3.9.5. 
Variables B, F and G are all dummy variables. As seen for variable B a mean of 
0.9808 means that 98.08% of all the companies in the study paid a dividend in the 
year of 2011 (all companies except Lundin Petroleum). Both variables F and G, 
industrial and geographical diversification are dummy variables and the table shows 
that 71.15% of the companies are active in more than one segment of their industry. 
88.46% of the companies are internationally diversified, i.e. they have revenues from 
operations in other countries than Sweden.  
 
	   A	   B	   C	   D	   E	   F	   G	  
Mean	   17.4661	   0.9808	   0.3535	   0.8738	   0.1384	   0.7115	   0.8846	  
Median	   17.4344	   1.0000	   0.3675	   0.8072	   0.0309	   1.0000	   1.0000	  
Max	   19.6794	   1.0000	   1.4635	   4.2212	   2.1268	   1.0000	   1.0000	  
Min	   14.2966	   0.0000	   -­‐5.3310	   0.0211	   0.0000	   0.0000	   0.0000	  
Std.	  Dev.	   1.0904	   0.1387	   0.8743	   0.7088	   0.3432	   0.4575	   0.3226	  
Obs.	   52	   52	   52	   52	   52	   52	   52	  
Table 4.2 – Descriptive statistics control variables 
 
Table 4.3 shows the statistics over the calculations and input used for computing 
Tobin’s q. As seen in the table, there are large variations among the companies here as 
well.  
 
	   MVE	   AVCL	   AVCA	   AVLTD	   DEBT	   TA	  
Mean	   62	  641	  038	   19	  892	  910	   24	  063	  669	   12	  401	  24
9	  
8	  230	  490	   68	  034	  078	  
Median	   25	  787	  172	   8	  618	  000	   10	  522	  067	   7	  630	  800	   2	  610	  433	   37	  296	  000	  
Max	   409	  614	  55
2	  
153	  210	  00
0	  
198	  816	  00
0	  
84	  287	  00
0	  
237	  360	  95
4	  
352	  083	  13
7	  Min	   6	  032	  187	   8	  000	   11	  000	   0	   -­‐78	  531	  000	   1	  617	  800	  
Std.	  
Dev.	  
88	  322	  301	   31	  596	  223	   41	  076	  931	   16	  496	  75
9	  
36	  880	  006	   84	  425	  333	  
Obs.	   52	   52	   52	   52	   52	   52	  
Table 4.3 – Descriptive statistics data for calculation of Tobin’s q 
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4.2 The Relative Use of Risk management  
As seen in table 4.4, regarding individual hits (RMI) on the selected words in our 
sample, we get a result that range, from 45, which is obtained by Melker Schörling, 
to 89, which is obtained by Ericsson. When it comes to the amount of total hits 
(RMT), the company with the lowest amounts of hits, is once again Melker 
Schörling (379), and the company with the most hits is Investor (2558).  
 
	   q	   ln(q)	   RMI	   RMT	  
Mean	   1.2817	   0.0006	   69	   1153	  
Median	   0.9337	   -­‐0.0686	   69	   1035	  
Max	   5.5810	   1.7194	   89	   2558	  
Min	   0.2259	   -­‐1.4875	   45	   379	  
Std.	  Dev.	   1.1295	   0.6676	   10	   491	  
Obs.	   52	   52	   52	   52	  
Table 4.4 – Descriptive statistic Tobin’s q, dependent variable, RMI and RMT 
 
When comparing these results graphically you can see that a relation exists, the 
companies with high amounts of individual hits also have a high amount of total hits, 
and the opposite.  
Figure 4.1 – Relation between RMI and RMT 
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4.3 Test of Data 
To see if the results of the regression analysis are reliable, we have tested the 
regressions for a series of violations of OLS assumptions previously described in 
section 3.9.1. The following section will describe the results of these tests. 
4.3.1 Heteroscedasticity  
If the errors in the regression do not have a constant variance they are heteroscedastic. 
This means that there is a systematic increase/decrease in the variance of the errors 
although the mean might be fairly constant. If the errors are heteroscedastic and this 
is ignored the model will still return unbiased and consistent coefficients. 
Heteroscedasticity may results in that the standard errors of the coefficients are 
underestimated and the p-values are too low. (Brooks, 2011) 
 
The regressions are tested for heteroscedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test. 
The null hypothesis is that the variance of the residuals is constant, i.e. we have 
homoscedasticity. The test is performed at 5% significance level. With p-values of 
0.2495 and 0.2650 respectively, we can accept the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity in the data and thus, this do not affect our results. 
 
Variable	   Coefficient	   p-­‐value	   Variable	   Coefficient	   p-­‐value	  
α	   -­‐0.2417	   0.8410	   α	   0.3748	   0.7730	  
RMI	   -­‐0.0023	   0.7407	   RMT	   0.0001	   0.4468	  
A	   -­‐0.0171	   0.8096	   A	   -­‐0.0640	   0.3859	  
B	   0.4049	   0.3862	   B	   0.4281	   0.3411	  
C	   0.0227	   0.7539	   C	   0.0397	   0.5710	  
D	   0.2251	   0.0461	   D	   0.1619	   0.1204	  
E	   0.1708	   0.5496	   E	   0.1013	   0.7165	  
F	   -­‐0.0915	   0.5754	   F	   -­‐0.0987	   0.5389	  
G	   0.5091	   0.0648	   G	   0.4436	   0.0930	  
R-­‐squared	   0.1998	   -­‐	   R-­‐squared	   0.1958	   -­‐	  
F-­‐statistic	   1.3417	   -­‐	   F-­‐statistic	   1.3088	   -­‐	  
p-­‐value	  F-­‐stat.	   -­‐	   0.2495	   p-­‐value.	  F-­‐stat.	   -­‐	   0.2650	  
Table 4.5 – Heteroscedasticity test 
4.3.2 Non-normality 
Assumption A5 says that the residuals in the OLS estimation must be normally 
distributed. If the residuals are not normally distributed the inferences made about 
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the coefficient might be wrong (Brooks, 2011). The normality assumption is tested 
using a Jarque-Bera test for normality, the null hypothesis is that the residuals are 
normally distributed. With p-values of 0.6609 and 0.7919 respectively, we can 
accept the null hypothesis of normally distributed residuals.  
 
	   Residual	  -­‐	  RMI	   Residual	  -­‐	  RMT	  
Mean	   0.0000	   0.0000	  
Median	   0.0070	   0.0158	  
Maximum	   1.1872	   1.2029	  
Minimum	   -­‐1.5301	   -­‐1.5144	  
Std.	  Dev.	   0.5630	   0.5542	  
Skewness	   -­‐0.3085	   -­‐0.2315	  
Kurtosis	   2.9591	   2.9695	  
Jarque-­‐Bera	   0.8284	   0.4667	  
p-­‐value	   0.6609	   0.7919	  
Observations	   52	   52	  
Table 4.6 – Normality test residuals 
 
4.3.3 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity occurs when the explanatory variables are very highly correlated 
with each other. This can lead to high R-square values but the individual coefficients 
will have poor precision and the regression becomes sensitive to small changes in 
specifications. The rule of thumb is that a correlation between the independents that 
is higher than 0.8 will affect the results. (Brooks, 2011) The correlation matrix below 
shows that we have no multicollinearity in our explanatory variables and thus, this 
will not affect the results of the regression analysis. 
Obs.	  52	   A	   B	   C	   D	   E	   F	   G	  
A	   1.0000	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
B	   0.0954	   1.0000	   	   	   	   	   	  
C	   0.1574	   0.0237	   1.0000	   	   	   	   	  
D	   -­‐0.3103	   0.0869	   -­‐0.0296	   1.0000	   	   	   	  
E	   -­‐0.0628	   -­‐0.1636	   0.0841	   -­‐0.3245	   1.0000	   	   	  
F	   0.3512	   0.2199	   -­‐0.1093	   0.0226	   -­‐0.4445	   1.0000	   	  
G	   0.1709	   -­‐0.0505	   -­‐0.0974	   -­‐0.0005	   -­‐0.6470	   0.3014	   1.0000	  
Table 4.7 – Correlation matrix control variables 
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4.4 Results From Regression Analysis 
In this section we present the results from the regression analysis. RMI and RMT are 
the dependent variables, variables A-G are the control variables previously defined in 
section 3.9.5. The coefficients in the table show if there is any relationship between 
the tested variables. The regression analysis is performed at 5% significance level, a p-
value below 0.05 means that the result is statistically significant. R-squared is the 
coefficient of determination, a value of 0.2890 means that the model can explain 
28.90% of the variation in the dependent variable. 
4.4.1 Results RMI 
The coefficient for RMI of -0.0075 indicates a weak negative relationship between 
company value and risk management, holding everything else constant. The results 
are not statistically significant at a 5% level. The only coefficient, which is statistically 
significant, is the coefficient for leverage (C), holding everything else constant. The 
complete model however, with a p-value of 0.0478 is statistically significant. This 
means that RMI on its own cannot explain the dependent variable ln(q), but all the 
explanatory variables combined in the model can explain the variations in the 
dependent variable ln(q) to a degree of 28.90% (R-squared). 
 
Variable	   Coefficient	  (β)	   p-­‐value	  
α	   2.6384	   0.1315	  
RMI	   -­‐0.0075	   0.4547	  
A	   -­‐0.0666	   0.5129	  
B	   -­‐0.9441	   0.1614	  
C	   -­‐0.2291	   0.0314	  
D	   0.1997	   0.2101	  
E	   -­‐0.0714	   0.8612	  
F	   -­‐0.3273	   0.1659	  
G	   0.1344	   0.7286	  
R-­‐squared	   0.2890	   -­‐	  
F-­‐Statistic	   2.1842	   0.0478	  
Table 4.8 – Regression output, RMI 
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4.4.2 Results RMT 
The coefficient for RMT is -0.0003, which indicates that there is almost no 
relationship between company value and risk management. Again the coefficient is 
not statistically significant. The only variable with a p-value lower than 0.05 is 
leverage (C), same as in the other analysis. Same as for RMI, significant F-statistics 
means that the whole model is significant and that all the explanatory variables 
combined can explain the variation in the dependent variable ln(q), in this model to a 
degree of 31.08%. 
 
Variable	   Coefficient	  (β)	   p-­‐value	  
α	   1.5746	   0.4042	  
RMT	   -­‐0.0003	   0.1697	  
A	   -­‐0.0216	   0.8391	  
B	   -­‐0.8933	   0.1724	  
C	   -­‐0.2318	   0.0262	  
D	   0.2182	   0.1476	  
E	   -­‐0.0071	   0.9860	  
F	   -­‐0.2901	   0.2153	  
G	   0.1444	   0.7012	  
R-­‐squared	   0.3108	   -­‐	  
F-­‐Statistic	   2.4239	   0.0294	  
Table 4.9 – Regression Output, RMT 
 
4.4.3 Explanation of Result Interpretation 
Since the data is cross-sectional the interpretation of the coefficients needs some 
explanation. The different coefficients vary in terms of their unit of measurement. 
The natural log of the calculated value of Tobin’s q is the dependent variable. This 
means that, when interpreting the coefficients, a one-unit increase in the 
independent variables account for a β percentage change in Tobin’s q. 
 
With a one-unit increase in RMI (i.e. if a company receives, a RMI of 678 instead of 
677) Tobin’s q will decrease with 0.0075%, holding all other variables constant. A 
one percent increases in leverage (C) will result in a decrease of Tobin’s q with 
0.2291% for RMI. The interpretation of individual coefficients should however be 
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done with caution since they are not statistically significant and the result may be due 
to randomness. 
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5 ANALYSIS 
This chapter put the empirical results together with theory. First we present a discussion 
around the measurement of risk management. This is followed by an analysis of the 
coefficients and the complete regression models. The chapter ends with a critical 
examination of the results and evaluates the validity of the selected proxy of risk 
management usage.  
5.1 Measurement Method Analysis 
The empirical results show that there are large variations in the data material with 
regards to the number of hits on the search words. For RMI, the mean and the 
median are the same (69), and the standard deviation is 10. The difference between 
the highest numbers of hits on individual words is 44. Ericsson has the most hits (89) 
and Melker Schörling the least (45). This is a large percentage difference (97.78%), 
however, the scale of measurement is too narrow to make any valid conclusions since 
there are too many companies that have the same RMI. The results can due to this be 
a bit misleading since the amount of hits are the only variable for determining the use 
of risk management. 
 
If we instead look at RMT, the percentage difference between Investor with 2558 hits 
and Melker Schörling with 379 hits, is substantial (574.93%). The mean is 1153 
with a standard deviation of 491. This data series contains more hits and has greater 
variance among the results. It is reasonable to consider that a company that mentions 
‘risk’ ten times is more involved in risk management compared to a company that 
only mention the word once. Hence RMT possibly show better results than RMI in 
terms of risk management usage. 
 
Since no one (to our knowledge) has previously used this kind of measure when 
investigating the relationship between risk management and company value, we 
cannot compare our results with another study using the same method. However, 
our results seem not to support the findings in the studies by Allayannis and Weston 
(2001) or Clark and Judge (2009). They suggest that risk management add 
additional value of 4.87% and 14% respectively. Our findings give the impression to 
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be more in line with the studies included in the compilation of commodity price and 
risk management, by Smithson and Simkins (2005). Their results either suggest no 
relationship or, a negative relationship between company value and the use of risk 
management. However, these studies were only conducted to see if there is any 
correlation between risk management and commodity price and hence not a very 
good comparison for our results. 
5.2 Coefficient Analysis 
With regard to our empirical results we cannot make any statement whether or not, 
risk management is value creating. With p-values of 0.4547 (RMI) and 0.1697 
(RMT) the results are insignificant. What the tests indicate is that risk management 
does not increase company value. We received coefficients of -0.0073 (RMI) and -
0.0003 (RMT), which implies that a one-unit increase in number of hits results in a 
0.075% (RMI) and 0.0003% (RMT) decrease in the relative company value. Instead 
of risk management being value creating, our results indicate that risk management 
could possibly be value destroying. As aforementioned, the results are insignificant 
and with such low p-values the reason that the results appear as they do can be due to 
randomness. We cannot prove that the use of risk management is value destroying, 
since the results are insignificant. However, this does not mean that we have proved 
that is not value destroying. 
 
The size of the sample might be a reason for not finding any significant results. 
Previous studies have included more companies, Allayannis and Weston (2001) 
sample consists of 720 companies, and Graham and Rogers (2002) sample include 
442 companies. In addition to a larger number of companies included in the study, 
they use data that covers a longer time period than one year. Even if we had received 
a result that indicated a positive relationship, the correlation would have had to be 
very strong to result in significant coefficients. 
 
In line with Allayannis and Weston (2001) we make sure that what is measured is the 
effect of risk management and not the effect of other parameters. To do this we 
include control variables, following the methodology of their study, that will help us 
to explain the dependent variable ln(q). 
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Both Peltzman (1977) and Allayannis and Weston (2001) argue that it would be 
reasonable to think that the size of a company will have positive effects on the 
company’s value, but that this effect is not connected to the use of risk management. 
The results from our regression analysis do not show any significant results that size 
have a positive impact of a company’s relative value. Instead our results indicate, both 
for RMI and RMT, that size might have a slightly negative relation to a company’s 
relative value. This is in line with the findings of Lang and Stulz (1994) and 
Allayannis and Weston (2001), who find significant negative relationship between 
company value and size. 
 
The argument stated by Allayannis and Weston (2001) for a positive relation 
between company value and the use of risk management, was built upon the fact that 
smaller companies do not have the same possibility to engage in hedging due to large 
start-up costs. Peltzman (1977) argues that size leads to higher efficiency. Since all 
companies in this study have a market capitalization of over 1 billion EUR, we find it 
hard to believe that they cannot afford risk management if they need it. According to 
this argumentation, we would expect our result to show no relation between size and 
company value. 
 
The second variable that we control for is the companies’ relative access to financial 
markets. This is done by a dummy variable. As Allayannis and Weston (2001) argue, 
companies using risk management may forgo positive NPV projects due to 
difficulties of financing these. Since we examine this variable by using a dividend 
dummy, and all companies except one paid a dividend, we will not analyze this 
variable further. 
 
The third control variable is leverage, this since the capital structure of a company 
has the ability to influence company value. Both the regressions generated significant 
results, although the results were not what we expected. Our results show that 
increased leverage leads to decreased company value. What can be noticed is that two 
companies, Axis and H&M, do not have any debt at all. This might have lead to 
disproportionate effects of leverages potential to increase company value.  
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The fourth control variable is profitability. Due to Allayannis and Weston (2001) 
more profitable companies are more likely to trade at a higher premium. If 
companies that use risk management are more profitable this will result in their q 
being higher. Our results are not significant, why we cannot make any statement, but 
the indication is that more profitable companies tend to have higher q. 
  
The fifth control variable is investment growth. Since the results regarding this 
variable have p-values as high as 0,8612 (RMI) and 0.9860 (RMT) it is not possible 
to make a statement regarding this variable. 
 
Industrial diversification is measured with a dummy and is expected to affect 
company value negatively. The results indicate a negative relation but with p-values 
of 0.1659 for RMI and 0.2153 for RMT the results are insignificant and the negative 
coefficients might be due to randomness. The p-values for geographical 
diversification are higher than 0.7 and hence we will not comment on that variable 
further.  
 
With the exception of leverage, none of the independent variables can explain Tobin’s 
q, holding everything else constant. The outcome from the overall test, including the 
control variables, is however significant. The p-values for the F-statistic of both 
regressions (RMI, 0.0478) and (RMT, 0.0294) are below the 5% significance level. 
However, even if the model is significant, the degree of explanation is only 0.2890 
(RMI) and 0.3108 (RMT). This means that around 70% of the explanation of 
Tobin’s q is due to other factors than those included in our regression models. 
 
Something worth mentioning is that our study is conducted on an inhomogeneous 
sample. Many other studies, including Jin and Jorion (2004), investigate the 
relationship between risk management and company value on companies that operate 
within the same industry. This makes it easier to derive increased value from the risk 
management engagement. Our sample, in line with Allayannis and Weston (2001) 
and Graham and Rogers (2002), include companies within different sectors. The 
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only thing the companies in our sample have in common is that they are listed on 
Nasdaq OMX Stockholm large cap. Companies in this kind of studies will conduct 
risk management due to different purposes why the value creation will be harder to 
trace.  
 
With regard to our inhomogeneous sample, a way to make the results a better 
reflection of the overall sample could be to exclude outliers. If the test should be 
conducted again it is worth considering excluding some companies that have the 
most extreme values. However, this should be done with great caution as this could 
lead to misleading results due to the exclusion of observations. As mentioned above, 
H&M and Axis do not have any debt. Especially since H&M is one of the largest 
companies this will lower the relationship between leverage and q. If excluding such 
outliers it could possibly give other, more significant results, not stating that these 
results would lead to correct interpretation. One could claim that it is rather a 
question of how representative the initial choice of data is than which companies to 
exclude from the set. 
5.3 Why to Expect Lower Value Creation 
As mentioned above, one probable reason for not finding any significant result in our 
study is due to the sample being too small. Even though the results came out 
insignificant there are reasons to believe that risk management should not have the 
same effect on the companies included in our sample as the theory suggest. 
 
Among others, Smithson et al. (1995) argue that risk management can be value-
creating due to convexity in the tax curve. This does not apply to Swedish companies 
since companies listed in Sweden always face a linear tax burden. This means that no 
value can be created due to this argument. 
 
Further, Myers (1977) and Froot et al. (1993) argue that risk management can be 
value creating with regards to its potential to reduce costs of agency problems. Since 
all companies in our study are listed corporations there are reasons to believe that 
these companies are well monitored. As Stulz (2003) implies, high monitoring reduce 
the risk of overinvestment problem and hence the cost of it. Since large companies 
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often are considered safer to invest in compared to small companies, they will attract 
larger investors. These investors will help monitor the management and by that, 
reduce the costs connected to agency problems. 
5.3.1 Disclosure as a Measurement 
Since our study use the disclosure of risk management as a proxy for the actual use of 
risk management, it is rational to question whether this method actually reflects what 
is meant to be measured. Legislations and standards, IFRS 7, require companies to 
disclose their work with financial instruments. However, these standards only require 
companies to disclose up to a minimum level, which leads to the risk that the level of 
voluntary disclosure among the companies’ in our sample varies. The consequence 
would be that our results do not demonstrate the correlation between risk 
management and company value, but instead the relationship between the disclosure 
of risk management and company value. If this were the case, our study would be 
more in line with Muller and Verschoor (2008) who studies if risk management 
disclosure has any impact on company value. These results are similar to what our 
results indicate, that no strong relation between company value and the use of risk 
management. That our results match can however be a coincidence.  
 
When we started this study we were well aware about the difficulties of how to 
measure the use of risk management, this since it has been a recurrent problem in 
earlier studies. Among others, Allayannis and Weston (2001) circumvent this 
problem by only categorize companies as users and non-users. What might increase 
the reliability of the method is the fact that Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) use a similar 
method when investigating the relationship between Enterprise Risk Management and 
company value. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
This section presents the theoretical and empirical conclusions that have been discussed in 
the analysis. The chapter ends with suggestions to further research within the same 
empirical and theoretical field.  
 
This study examines the risk management activities of 52 Swedish companies, all 
listed on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm, Large cap. This is conducted to see if there is any 
relation between risk management engagement and company value. The level of risk 
management disclosure in their annual reports determines the amount of risk 
management the companies use. The companies’ relative values are measured by 
Tobin’s q. 
 
The outcome of the study is that no significant results can explain the relationship 
between risk management and company value. The results seem to suggest that 
instead of risk management having a positive impact on company value, it seems to 
have a negative effect. This result is not in line with the results presented by 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Graham and Rogers (2002). When we include 
control variables in the models, the outcome of the regression analysis are significant 
and can explain close to 30% of the variation in q. 
 
One probable reason why the results came out to be insignificant can be due to the 
size of the sample. It can also be due to the fact that the sample is inhomogeneous 
when it comes to which industries’ the companies are operating in. With a larger 
sample and a larger number of observations, the p-values will probably decrease and 
hence, make it possible to make significant statements about the result. When 
investigating companies operating under similar circumstances, it is easier to trace 
variations in value to engagement in risk management. 
 
Since all companies in the sample can be considered large and the fact that they are 
listed in Sweden give reasons to believe that risk management should not have the 
same impact as the theory suggests. This is derived from the fact that Swedish 
companies face fixed percentage taxation and that large listed companies are well 
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monitored by stakeholders. These arguments will reduce benefits from the convex tax 
curve as well as the potential of risk management to reduce costs connected to agency 
problems. 
 
Due to the limited amount of time, we have been forced to restrict the scope of this 
study. This give rise to suggestions of further research within the topic. Since our 
results came out insignificant, we suggest that research including a larger sample 
would be of interest. A larger sample while using the same method has the potential 
to make valid statements on whether risk management is value adding or not to a 
greater extent. 
 
Further, it would be interesting to conduct the same method when investigating the 
relationship between company value and risk management on a more homogenous 
sample. This will make it easier to trace the risk management activities to the relative 
values of the companies. 
 
Since the measurement of risk management can, due to our experiences and previous 
research, be considered very hard, we suggest a study that includes a combination of 
quantitative empirical data and a qualitative investigation. This would help reduce 
the probability of a result that deviates from the companies’ actual use of risk 
management and hence increase the validity of the findings. 
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APPENDIX 
The appendix contains full lists and tables of, companies, search words and data used.  
Appendix A - Companies Included in the Study 
ABB Alfa Laval 
Alliance Oil ASSA Abloy 
AstraZeneca Atlas Copco 
Atrium Ljungberg Axfood 
Axis Billerud 
Boliden Castellum 
Electrolux Elekta 
Ericsson Fabege 
Getinge Hakon Invest 
Hennes & Mauritz Hexagon 
Holmen Hufvudstaden 
Husqvarna Industrivärden 
Investor Kinnevik 
Latour Investment Lundebergsföretagen 
Lundin Petroleum Meda 
Melker Shörling Millicom International 
Modern Times Group – MTG NCC 
Nibe Industrier Oriflame Cosmetics 
Peab Ratos 
SAAB Sandvik 
Scania SCA 
Securitas Skanska 
SKF SSAB 
Swedish Match Tele2 
TeliaSonera Tieto Corporation 
Trelleborg Wallenstam 
Volvo  
Appendix A Table 1 – Companies included in the study 
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Appendix B - Search Words 
ACCESS+CAPITAL+MARKET 
ACCURA+INFORMATION 
APPROV+STRATEGIES+BOARD 
ASSESS+RISK+MANAGE+EXTERNAL 
AUDIT+COMMITTEE+RESPONSIBILIT 
BENCHMARK+EVALUAT+RESULT 
BOARD+RESPONSIBILITY 
BUDGET+INTERNAL+AUDIT 
BUSINESS+CYCLE 
BUSINESS+OBJECTIVE 
CENTRAL+TECHNOLOG+RISK 
COMMERCIAL+RISK 
COMMODITY 
COMMODITY+PRICE 
COMMODITY+PRICE+RISK 
COMMUNICA+RISK+MANAGE 
COMMUNICAT+REGULATION 
COMMUNICATE+EXTERNAL 
COMPETITION 
COMPLIANCE 
COMPLIANCE+INDUSTRY 
COMPLIANCE+REGULATION 
COMPLIANCE+RISK 
CORRELATION+COMBIN+RISK 
CORRELATION+RISK 
COST+OF+CAPITAL 
CREDIT+EXPOSURE 
CREDIT+RISK 
CREDIT+RISK+POLICY 
CURRENCY 
CURRENCY+EXPOSURE 
CURRENCY+FLUCTUATION 
CURRENCY+RISK 
DATA+MANAGEMENT 
DATA+RISK 
DERIVATIVES 
DERIVATIVES+RISK 
DISASTER+RECOVERY+PLAN 
DOCUMENT+CONTROL 
ECONOMIC+RISK 
EQUITIES+RISK 
EQUITY+RISK 
EXCHANGE 
EXCHANGE+RATE 
EXCHANGE+RATE+EXPOSURE 
EXPOSURE 
FINANCIAL+EXPOSURE 
FINANCIAL+RISK 
FLUCTUATION 
FOREIGN+EXCHANGE+RATE 
FUNDING+RISK 
FX+EXPOSURE 
HEDGE 
HEDGING 
HEDGING+RISK 
INDEPENDENT+VERIFI 
INFLATION 
INTEREST 
INTEREST+RATE 
INTEREST+RATE+EXPOSURE 
INTEREST+RATE+RISK 
INTERNAL+AUDIT 
KEY+RISK+INDICATOR 
LIQUIDITY 
LIQUIDITY+RISK 
LITIGATION 
LONG-TERM+DEBT 
LONG+TERM+DEBT 
MANAGE+RISK 
MANUFACTUR+LOCATION+CONCE-
NTRAT 
MARKET+RISK 
MINIMIZATION+RISK 
MINIMIZE+RISK 
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MONITORING+RISK 
OPERATIONAL+EXPOSURE 
PAYMENT+RISK 
PORTFOLIO+RISK 
PRICE+RISK 
PROCESS+CONTROL 
PROCESS+MANAGE+RISK 
PRODUCTION+RISK 
QUANTITATIVE+IMPACT+KEY+PERF-
ORMANCE+INDICATOR 
REDUCING+EXPOSURE 
REFINANCING+RISK 
REPORT+BOARD+RISK+MANAGE 
REPUTATION+RISK 
REVIEW+EFFECTIV+CONTROL 
RISK 
RISK+ANALYSIS 
RISK+ASSESSMENT 
RISK+AWARENESS 
RISK+EXPOSURE 
RISK+FACTOR 
RISK+IDENTIFICATION 
RISK+MANAGEMENT 
RISK+POLICY 
RISK+REDUC 
RISK+REDUCTION 
SAFETY 
SALE+CONTROL 
SALES+CONTROL 
STRATEGIC+RISK 
STRATEGIES 
STRATEGY 
TECHNOLOG+RISK 
TRANSACTION+EXPOSURE 
TRANSLATION+EXPOSURE 
VALID+INFORMATION 
WRITTEN+GUIDELINE+MANAGE+ 
RISK  
 
Appendix B Table 1 – Complete l ist of search words used in the study
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Appendix C - Overview of Data 
Regression Variables 
	  
A	   B	   C	   D	   E	   F	   G	  
ABB	  (OME)	   19.4228	   1	   0.2047	   0.8986	   0.0268	   1	   1	  
ALFA	  LAVAL	   17.3183	   1	   0.3377	   0.8627	   0.0193	   1	   1	  
ALLIANCE	  OIL	  SDB	   17.1815	   1	   0.7743	   0.6844	   0.3071	   0	   1	  
ASSA	  ABLOY	   17.8153	   1	   0.3154	   0.7654	   0.0214	   1	   1	  
ASTRAZENECA	  (OME)	   19.6793	   1	   0.3156	   0.6316	   0.0249	   1	   1	  
ATLAS	  COPCO	   18.1203	   1	   0.5912	   1.0964	   0.0212	   1	   1	  
ATRIUM	  LJUNGBERG	   16.9574	   1	   0.8217	   0.0871	   0.5472	   0	   0	  
AXFOOD	   15.9248	   1	   0.0139	   4.2211	   0.0187	   1	   0	  
AXIS	   14.2965	   1	   0.0000	   2.2113	   0.0125	   0	   1	  
BILLERUD	   16.0491	   1	   0.1681	   0.9763	   0.0510	   0	   1	  
BOLIDEN	   17.4416	   1	   0.2362	   1.0733	   0.0990	   1	   1	  
ELECTROLUX	   18.1114	   1	   0.4693	   1.3840	   0.0311	   1	   1	  
ELEKTA	   15.9852	   1	   0.2040	   0.9026	   0.0112	   0	   1	  
ERICSSON	   19.4039	   1	   0.1625	   0.8488	   0.0220	   1	   1	  
FABEGE	   17.2401	   1	   1.1371	   0.0587	   1.1014	   0	   0	  
GETINGE	   17.5263	   1	   1.0351	   0.5344	   0.0427	   1	   1	  
HAKON	  INVEST	   16.1002	   1	   0.0039	   0.2543	   0.0096	   1	   1	  
HENNES	  &	  MAURITZ	   17.8922	   1	   0.0000	   1.8658	   0.0463	   0	   1	  
HEXAGON	   17.6647	   1	   0.5588	   0.4168	   0.0178	   1	   1	  
HOLMEN	   17.4270	   1	   0.1648	   0.5039	   0.0977	   1	   1	  
HUFVUDSTADEN	   16.9376	   1	   0.3303	   0.0634	   0.6579	   0	   0	  
HUSQVARNA	   17.1505	   1	   0.5628	   1.0811	   0.0231	   1	   1	  
INDUSTRIVARDEN	   17.8605	   1	   0.3563	   0.0447	   0.0000	   1	   1	  
INVESTOR	   19.1764	   1	   0.2863	   0.0915	   0.0294	   1	   1	  
KINNEVIK	   18.0649	   1	   0.0827	   0.1254	   0.0901	   1	   1	  
LATOUR	  INVESTMENT	   16.4235	   1	   0.0371	   0.5283	   0.0252	   1	   1	  
LUNDBERGFORETAGEN	   18.2608	   1	   0.3191	   0.2652	   0.1575	   1	   1	  
LUNDIN	  PETROLEUM	   16.7305	   0	   0.2068	   0.4383	   0.5357	   0	   1	  
MEDA	   17.4570	   1	   0.9958	   0.3369	   0.0096	   0	   1	  
MELKER	  SCHORLING	   16.7791	   1	   0.0799	   0.0210	   0.0000	   1	   1	  
MILLICOM	  INT.	   17.6835	   1	   0.8059	   0.6027	   0.1544	   0	   1	  
MODERN	  TIMES	  GP.MTG	   16.2329	   1	   0.3691	   1.2011	   0.0089	   1	   1	  
NCC	   17.3038	   1	   0.4646	   1.6049	   0.0141	   1	   1	  
NIBE	  INDUSTRIER	   16.2712	   1	   0.9355	   0.6983	   0.0318	   1	   1	  
ORIFLAME	  COSMETICS	  	   15.7689	   1	   1.4634	   1.8847	   0.0312	   1	   1	  
PEAB	   17.2556	   1	   0.9310	   1.3958	   0.0121	   1	   1	  
RATOS	   17.4868	   1	   0.8542	   0.7621	   0.0319	   1	   0	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A	   B	   C	   D	   E	   F	   G	  
SAAB	   17.2722	   1	   0.0940	   0.7409	   0.0138	   1	   1	  
SANDVIK	   18.3764	   1	   0.7622	   0.9834	   0.0530	   1	   1	  
SCA	   18.7448	   1	   0.4535	   0.5881	   0.0726	   1	   1	  
SCANIA	   18.4981	   1	   0.5508	   0.8519	   0.0425	   1	   1	  
SECURITAS	   17.3752	   1	   0.9301	   1.8221	   0.0157	   0	   1	  
SKANSKA	   18.2111	   1	   0.0686	   1.4640	   0.0185	   1	   1	  
SKF	   17.8772	   1	   0.5828	   1.1401	   0.0277	   0	   1	  
SSAB	   17.9544	   1	   0.5505	   0.7115	   0.0696	   1	   1	  
SWEDISH	  MATCH	   16.4350	   1	   0.0000	   0.8497	   0.0210	   1	   1	  
TELE2	   17.5910	   1	   0.5700	   0.9341	   0.1060	   1	   1	  
TELIASONERA	   19.3200	   1	   0.5714	   0.4245	   0.1666	   1	   1	  
TIETO	  CORPORATION	   16.2088	   1	   0.2088	   1.4856	   0.0306	   0	   1	  
TRELLEBORG	   17.1391	   1	   0.4087	   1.0484	   0.0368	   1	   1	  
WALLENSTAM	   17.1816	   1	   0.3658	   0.0560	   2.1267	   0	   0	  
VOLVO	   19.6456	   1	   0.9965	   0.9117	   0.0505	   1	   1	  
Appendix C Table 1 – Overview of control variables. The table shows the 
complete values for all the control variables included in the regression analysis. 
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Accounting Data 
	  	   TA	   CE	   LTD	   Revenues	   CAPEX	  
ABB	  (OME)	   272	  423	  052	   108	  494	  724	   22	  218	  828	   244	  811	  511	   6	  577	  526	  
ALFA	  LAVAL	   33	  210	  000	   14	  982	  000	   5	  060	  000	   28	  652	  000	   555	  000	  
ALLIANCE	  OIL	  SDB	   28	  963	  211	   13	  488	  655	   10	  445	  356	   19	  824	  186	   6	  089	  069	  
ASSA	  ABLOY	   54	  587	  000	   23	  527	  000	   7	  422	  000	   41	  786	  000	   898	  000	  
ASTRAZENECA	  (OME)	   352	  083	  137	   159	  492	  646	   50	  346	  599	   222	  407	  620	   5	  555	  059	  
ATLAS	  COPCO	   74	  057	  000	   28	  776	  000	   17	  013	  000	   81	  203	  000	   1	  728	  000	  
ATRIUM	  LJUNGBERG	   23	  149	  400	   9	  540	  500	   7	  839	  600	   2	  018	  100	   1	  104	  400	  
AXFOOD	   8	  243	  000	   3	  237	  000	   45	  000	   34	  795	  000	   652	  000	  
AXIS	   1	  617	  800	   768	  600	   0	   3	  577	  600	   44	  800	  
BILLERUD	   9	  334	  000	   4	  871	  000	   819	  000	   9	  113	  000	   465	  000	  
BOLIDEN	   37	  569	  000	   21	  020	  000	   4	  967	  000	   40	  323	  000	   3	  992	  000	  
ELECTROLUX	   73	  404	  000	   20	  535	  000	   9	  639	  000	   101	  598	  000	   3	  163	  000	  
ELEKTA	   8	  756	  000	   3	  832	  000	   782	  000	   7	  904	  000	   89	  000	  
ERICSSON	   267	  329	  000	   143	  105	  000	   23	  256	  000	   226	  921	  000	   4	  994	  000	  
FABEGE	   30	  711	  000	   11	  890	  000	   13	  521	  000	   1	  804	  000	   1	  987	  000	  
GETINGE	   40	  889	  000	   14	  608	  000	   15	  121	  000	   21	  854	  000	   935	  000	  
HAKON	  INVEST	   9	  823	  000	   8	  456	  000	   33	  000	   2	  498	  000	   24	  000	  
HENNES	  &	  MAURITZ	   58	  954	  000	   44	  104	  000	   0	   109	  999	  000	   5	  103	  000	  
HEXAGON	   46	  956	  421	   22	  505	  164	   12	  576	  336	   19	  572	  770	   349	  642	  
HOLMEN	   37	  023	  000	   19	  773	  000	   3	  259	  000	   18	  656	  000	   1	  824	  000	  
HUFVUDSTADEN	   22	  695	  000	   12	  486	  900	   4	  125	  000	   1	  440	  100	   947	  500	  
HUSQVARNA	   28	  079	  000	   12	  332	  000	   6	  941	  000	   30	  357	  000	   702	  000	  
INDUSTRIVARDEN	   57	  116	  000	   39	  140	  000	   13	  947	  000	   2	  555	  000	   0	  
INVESTOR	   212	  920	  000	   156	  070	  000	   44	  693	  000	   19	  484	  000	   573	  000	  
KINNEVIK	   70	  068	  000	   59	  637	  000	   4	  936	  000	   8	  789	  000	   792	  000	  
LATOUR	  INVESTMENT	   13	  573	  000	   10	  489	  000	   390	  000	   7	  171	  000	   181	  000	  
LUNDBERGFORETAGEN	   85	  226	  000	   30	  969	  000	   9	  885	  000	   22	  604	  000	   3	  561	  000	  
LUNDIN	  PETROLEUM	   18	  449	  330	   6	  904	  064	   1	  427	  882	   8	  088	  047	   4	  333	  236	  
MEDA	   38	  152	  000	   14	  975	  000	   14	  913	  000	   12	  856	  000	   124	  000	  
MELKER	  SCHORLING	   19	  368	  000	   16	  636	  000	   1	  330	  000	   408	  000	   0	  
MILLICOM	  INT.	   47	  850	  469	   15	  487	  960	   12	  482	  049	   28	  840	  719	   4	  454	  989	  
MODERN	  TIMES	  GP.	   11	  217	  000	   4	  128	  000	   1	  524	  000	   13	  473	  000	   120	  000	  
NCC	   32	  733	  000	   8	  286	  000	   3	  850	  000	   52	  535	  000	   741	  000	  
NIBE	  INDUSTRIER	   11	  655	  300	   4	  487	  200	   4	  198	  000	   8	  139	  800	   259	  100	  
ORIFLAME	  COSMETICS	   7	  053	  199	   1	  993	  732	   2	  917	  785	   13	  293	  272	   415	  831	  
PEAB	   31	  191	  000	   7	  947	  000	   7	  399	  000	   43	  539	  000	   529	  000	  
RATOS	   39	  305	  000	   13	  658	  000	   11	  667	  000	   29	  955	  000	   956	  000	  
SAAB	   31	  713	  000	   12	  950	  000	   1	  218	  000	   23	  498	  000	   326	  000	  
SANDVIK	   95	  669	  000	   32	  490	  000	   24	  767	  000	   94	  084	  000	   4	  994	  000	  
SCA	   138	  289	  000	   60	  752	  000	   27	  553	  000	   81	  337	  000	   5	  911	  000	  
SCANIA	   108	  058	  000	   34	  511	  000	   19	  011	  000	   92	  058	  000	   3	  921	  000	  
SECURITAS	   35	  155	  300	   9	  202	  900	   8	  560	  300	   64	  057	  100	   1	  009	  800	  
SKANSKA	   81	  099	  000	   19	  413	  000	   1	  333	  000	   118	  734	  000	   2	  206	  000	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   TA	   CE	   LTD	   Revenues	   CAPEX	  
SKF	   58	  075	  000	   21	  436	  000	   12	  495	  000	   66	  216	  000	   1	  839	  000	  
SSAB	   62	  737	  000	   30	  768	  000	   16	  940	  000	   44	  640	  000	   3	  111	  000	  
SWEDISH	  MATCH	   13	  729	  000	   -­‐1	  601	  000	   8	  535	  000	   11	  666	  000	   245	  000	  
TELE2	   43	  623	  000	   21	  449	  000	   12	  227	  000	   40	  750	  000	   4	  323	  000	  
TELIASONERA	   245	  808	  000	   116	  680	  000	   66	  682	  000	   104	  354	  000	   17	  394	  000	  
TIETO	  CORPORATION	   10	  950	  417	   5	  024	  466	   1	  049	  211	   16	  268	  555	   499	  243	  
TRELLEBORG	   27	  760	  000	   13	  338	  000	   5	  452	  000	   29	  106	  000	   1	  074	  000	  
WALLENSTAM	   28	  967	  000	   10	  294	  000	   3	  766	  000	   1	  625	  000	   3	  456	  000	  
VOLVO	   340	  406	  000	   84	  581	  000	   84	  287	  000	   310	  367	  000	   15	  703	  000	  
	   CL	   CA	   Mkt.	  Cap.	   Int.	  Sales	   Div.	  Paid	  
ABB	  (OME)	   115	  845	  986	   165	  537	  491	   296	  877	  347	   150	  316	  755	   10	  107	  872	  
ALFA	  LAVAL	   10	  997	  000	   15	  619	  000	   54	  697	  103	   27	  710	  000	   1	  258	  000	  
ALLIANCE	  OIL	  SDB	   3	  451	  184	   6	  221	  778	   14	  708	  562	   19	  824	  186	   2	  553	  
ASSA	  ABLOY	   18	  563	  000	   16	  072	  000	   63	  490	  975	   39	  134	  000	   1	  472	  000	  
ASTRAZENECA	  (OME)	   108	  075	  719	   161	  276	  526	   409	  614	  552	   209	  297	  946	   24	  921	  624	  
ATLAS	  COPCO	   25	  324	  000	   47	  119	  000	   179	  318	  876	   79	  347	  000	   4	  851	  000	  
ATRIUM	  LJUNGBERG	   2	  939	  300	   838	  300	   9	  533	  999	   0	   312	  400	  
AXFOOD	   4	  324	  000	   3	  937	  000	   13	  305	  803	   0	   630	  000	  
AXIS	   747	  400	   1	  431	  000	   9	  620	  383	   2	  098	  300	   312	  600	  
BILLERUD	   1	  922	  000	   3	  827	  000	   6	  032	  187	   8	  348	  000	   361	  000	  
BOLIDEN	   6	  918	  000	   11	  276	  000	   27	  487	  872	   32	  700	  000	   1	  369	  000	  
ELECTROLUX	   37	  563	  000	   43	  066	  000	   31	  227	  775	   97	  388	  000	   1	  850	  000	  
ELEKTA	   3	  928	  000	   5	  761	  000	   25	  815	  354	   7	  862	  000	   280	  000	  
ERICSSON	   97	  029	  000	   198	  816	  000	   226	  019	  568	   223	  039	  000	   7	  455	  000	  
FABEGE	   4	  098	  000	   438	  000	   8	  743	  932	   0	   489	  000	  
GETINGE	   7	  528	  000	   12	  769	  000	   41	  563	  597	   21	  412	  000	   775	  000	  
HAKON	  INVEST	   930	  000	   1	  828	  000	   15	  407	  686	   162	  000	   472	  000	  
HENNES	  &	  MAURITZ	   14	  757	  000	   39	  918	  000	   354	  185	  408	   93	  656	  000	   15	  723	  000	  
HEXAGON	   9	  068	  365	   10	  052	  134	   36	  271	  183	   18	  400	  704	   498	  847	  
HOLMEN	   6	  663	  000	   6	  800	  000	   16	  606	  041	   14	  211	  000	   588	  000	  
HUFVUDSTADEN	   716	  100	   432	  000	   14	  448	  929	   0	   474	  400	  
HUSQVARNA	   6	  409	  000	   13	  895	  000	   18	  154	  622	   29	  088	  000	   859	  000	  
INDUSTRIVARDEN	   3	  502	  000	   161	  000	   31	  712	  867	   0	   1	  545	  000	  
INVESTOR	   7	  774	  000	   18	  647	  000	   97	  648	  954	   10	  881	  000	   3	  802	  000	  
KINNEVIK	   3	  830	  000	   3	  465	  000	   37	  170	  277	   7	  027	  000	   1	  247	  000	  
LATOUR	  INVESTMENT	   2	  394	  000	   3	  193	  000	   17	  018	  650	   4	  206	  000	   491	  000	  
LUNDBERGFORETAGEN	   8	  626	  000	   8	  444	  000	   25	  172	  000	   14	  212	  000	   465	  000	  
LUNDIN	  PETROLEUM	   2	  778	  610	   2	  055	  626	   52	  625	  928	   8	  088	  047	   0	  
MEDA	   5	  033	  000	   5	  009	  000	   21	  640	  603	   8	  897	  000	   604	  000	  
MELKER	  SCHORLING	   8	  000	   11	  000	   16	  866	  560	   0	   146	  000	  
MILLICOM	  INT.	   18	  475	  123	   11	  772	  307	   68	  900	  690	   28	  840	  719	   3	  144	  803	  
MODERN	  TIMES	  GP.	   4	  763	  000	   5	  668	  000	   21	  833	  384	   9	  180	  000	   498	  000	  
NCC	   16	  839	  000	   26	  414	  000	   13	  120	  734	   23	  574	  000	   1	  084	  000	  
NIBE	  INDUSTRIER	   1	  995	  100	   4	  064	  400	   11	  196	  513	   6	  196	  700	   164	  400	  
ORIFLAME	  COSMETICS	   2	  425	  377	   5	  048	  600	   12	  355	  676	   13	  242	  840	   759	  926	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   CL	   CA	   Mkt.	  Cap.	   Int.	  Sales	   Div.	  Paid	  
PEAB	   15	  194	  000	   20	  499	  000	   10	  117	  222	   7	  616	  000	   746	  000	  
RATOS	   11	  259	  000	   12	  210	  000	   25	  758	  989	   0	   1	  678	  000	  
SAAB	   14	  321	  000	   18	  911	  000	   14	  455	  533	   14	  819	  000	   367	  000	  
SANDVIK	   31	  236	  000	   54	  395	  000	   100	  181	  952	   89	  851	  000	   3	  807	  000	  
SCA	   28	  893	  000	   31	  892	  000	   71	  638	  934	   73	  893	  000	   2	  898	  000	  
SCANIA	   41	  523	  000	   49	  960	  000	   81	  600	  000	   43	  438	  000	   4	  000	  000	  
SECURITAS	   15	  229	  400	   15	  329	  600	   21	  684	  498	   59	  924	  000	   1	  095	  200	  
SKANSKA	   57	  151	  000	   64	  277	  000	   46	  920	  116	   88	  219	  000	   4	  945	  000	  
SKF	   13	  245	  000	   33	  348	  000	   66	  299	  116	   64	  064	  000	   2	  277	  000	  
SSAB	   9	  971	  000	   21	  040	  000	   19	  646	  644	   35	  234	  000	   648	  000	  
SWEDISH	  MATCH	   4	  714	  000	   5	  564	  000	   49	  879	  254	   5	  353	  000	   1	  152	  000	  
TELE2	   10	  975	  000	   9	  507	  000	   59	  471	  680	   28	  352	  000	   11	  991	  000	  
TELIASONERA	   36	  168	  000	   36	  643	  000	   202	  518	  065	   68	  295	  000	   12	  349	  000	  
TIETO	  CORPORATION	  	   4	  408	  644	   5	  262	  963	   6	  996	  201	   6	  042	  530	   444	  958	  
TRELLEBORG	   8	  610	  000	   10	  992	  000	   16	  196	  539	   27	  444	  000	   474	  000	  
WALLENSTAM	   12	  083	  000	   461	  000	   10	  909	  300	   0	   200	  000	  
VOLVO	   153	  210	  000	   136	  046	   152	  665	  325	   296	  259	  000	   5	  069	  000	  
Appendix C Table 2 – Overview of Accounting Data. The table shows the data 
collected from Thomson Reuters DataStream. All numbers are expressed in SEK 
thousands. 
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Data for Tobin’s q Calculations 
	  	   AVCL	   AVCA	   AVLTD	  
ABB	  (OME)	   115	  845	  986	   165	  537	  491	   22	  218	  828	  
ALFA	  LAVAL	   10	  997	  000	   15	  619	  000	   5	  060	  000	  
ALLIANCE	  OIL	  SDB	   3	  451	  184	   6	  221	  778	   10	  445	  356	  
ASSA	  ABLOY	   18	  563	  000	   16	  072	  000	   7	  422	  000	  
ASTRAZENECA	  (OME)	   108	  075	  719	   161	  276	  526	   50	  346	  599	  
ATLAS	  COPCO	   25	  324	  000	   47	  119	  000	   17	  013	  000	  
ATRIUM	  LJUNGBERG	   2	  939	  300	   838	  300	   7	  839	  600	  
AXFOOD	   4	  324	  000	   3	  937	  000	   45	  000	  
AXIS	   747	  400	   1	  431	  000	   0	  
BILLERUD	   1	  922	  000	   3	  827	  000	   819	  000	  
BOLIDEN	   6	  918	  000	   11	  276	  000	   4	  967	  000	  
ELECTROLUX	   37	  563	  000	   43	  066	  000	   9	  639	  000	  
ELEKTA	   3	  928	  000	   5	  761	  000	   782	  000	  
ERICSSON	   97	  029	  000	   198	  816	  000	   23	  256	  000	  
FABEGE	   4	  098	  000	   438	  000	   13	  521	  000	  
GETINGE	   7	  528	  000	   12	  769	  000	   15	  121	  000	  
HAKON	  INVEST	   930	  000	   1	  828	  000	   33	  000	  
HENNES	  &	  MAURITZ	   14	  757	  000	   39	  918	  000	   0	  
HEXAGON	   9	  068	  365	   10	  052	  134	   12	  576	  336	  
HOLMEN	   6	  663	  000	   6	  800	  000	   3	  259	  000	  
HUFVUDSTADEN	   716	  100	   432	  000	   4	  125	  000	  
HUSQVARNA	   6	  409	  000	   13	  895	  000	   6	  941	  000	  
INDUSTRIVARDEN	   3	  502	  000	   161	  000	   13	  947	  000	  
INVESTOR	   7	  774	  000	   18	  647	  000	   44	  693	  000	  
KINNEVIK	   3	  830	  000	   3	  465	  000	   4	  936	  000	  
LATOUR	  INVESTMENT	   2	  394	  000	   3	  193	  000	   390	  000	  
LUNDBERGFORETAGEN	   8	  626	  000	   8	  444	  000	   9	  885	  000	  
LUNDIN	  PETROLEUM	   2	  778	  610	   2	  055	  626	   1	  427	  882	  
MEDA	   5	  033	  000	   5	  009	  000	   14	  913	  000	  
MELKER	  SCHORLING	   8	  000	   11	  000	   1	  330	  000	  
MILLICOM	  INT.	   18	  475	  123	   11	  772	  307	   12	  482	  049	  
MODERN	  TIMES	  GP.	   4	  763	  000	   5	  668	  000	   1	  524	  000	  
NCC	   16	  839	  000	   26	  414	  000	   3	  850	  000	  
NIBE	  INDUSTRIER	   1	  995	  100	   4	  064	  400	   4	  198	  000	  
ORIFLAME	  COSMETICS	   2	  425	  377	   5	  048	  600	   2	  917	  785	  
PEAB	   15	  194	  000	   20	  499	  000	   7	  399	  000	  
RATOS	   11	  259	  000	   12	  210	  000	   11	  667	  000	  
SAAB	   14	  321	  000	   18	  911	  000	   1	  218	  000	  
SANDVIK	   31	  236	  000	   54	  395	  000	   24	  767	  000	  
SCA	   28	  893	  000	   31	  892	  000	   27	  553	  000	  
SCANIA	   41	  523	  000	   49	  960	  000	   19	  011	  000	  
SECURITAS	   15	  229	  400	   15	  329	  600	   8	  560	  300	  
SKANSKA	   57	  151	  000	   64	  277	  000	   1	  333	  000	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   AVCL	   AVCA	   AVLTD	  
SKF	   13	  245	  000	   33	  348	  000	   12	  495	  000	  
SSAB	   9	  971	  000	   21	  040	  000	   16	  940	  000	  
SWEDISH	  MATCH	   4	  714	  000	   5	  564	  000	   8	  535	  000	  
TELE2	   10	  975	  000	   9	  507	  000	   12	  227	  000	  
TELIASONERA	   36	  168	  000	   36	  643	  000	   66	  682	  000	  
TIETO	  CORPORATION	  (OME)	   4	  408	  644	   5	  262	  963	   1	  049	  211	  
TRELLEBORG	   8	  610	  000	   10	  992	  000	   5	  452	  000	  
WALLENSTAM	   12	  083	  000	   461	  000	   3	  766	  000	  
VOLVO	   153	  210	  000	   136	  046	   84	  287	  000	  
	   MVE	   DEBT	   TA	  
ABB	  (OME)	   296	  877	  347	   -­‐27	  472	  677	   272	  423	  052	  
ALFA	  LAVAL	   54	  697	  103	   438	  000	   33	  210	  000	  
ALLIANCE	  OIL	  SDB	   14	  708	  562	   7	  674	  762	   28	  963	  211	  
ASSA	  ABLOY	   63	  490	  975	   9	  913	  000	   54	  587	  000	  
ASTRAZENECA	  (OME)	   409	  614	  552	   -­‐2	  854	  208	   352	  083	  137	  
ATLAS	  COPCO	   179	  318	  876	   -­‐4	  782	  000	   74	  057	  000	  
ATRIUM	  LJUNGBERG	   9	  533	  999	   9	  940	  600	   23	  149	  400	  
AXFOOD	   13	  305	  803	   432	  000	   8	  243	  000	  
AXIS	   9	  620	  383	   -­‐683	  600	   1	  617	  800	  
BILLERUD	   6	  032	  187	   -­‐1	  086	  000	   9	  334	  000	  
BOLIDEN	   27	  487	  872	   609	  000	   37	  569	  000	  
ELECTROLUX	   31	  227	  775	   4	  136	  000	   73	  404	  000	  
ELEKTA	   25	  815	  354	   -­‐1	  051	  000	   8	  756	  000	  
ERICSSON	   226	  019	  568	   -­‐78	  531	  000	   267	  329	  000	  
FABEGE	   8	  743	  932	   17	  181	  000	   30	  711	  000	  
GETINGE	   41	  563	  597	   9	  880	  000	   40	  889	  000	  
HAKON	  INVEST	   15	  407	  686	   -­‐865	  000	   9	  823	  000	  
HENNES	  &	  MAURITZ	   354	  185	  408	   -­‐25	  161	  000	   58	  954	  000	  
HEXAGON	   36	  271	  183	   11	  592	  567	   46	  956	  421	  
HOLMEN	   16	  606	  041	   3	  122	  000	   37	  023	  000	  
HUFVUDSTADEN	   14	  448	  929	   4	  409	  100	   22	  695	  000	  
HUSQVARNA	   18	  154	  622	   -­‐545	  000	   28	  079	  000	  
INDUSTRIVARDEN	   31	  712	  867	   17	  288	  000	   57	  116	  000	  
INVESTOR	   97	  648	  954	   33	  820	  000	   212	  920	  000	  
KINNEVIK	   37	  170	  277	   5	  301	  000	   70	  068	  000	  
LATOUR	  INVESTMENT	   17	  018	  650	   -­‐409	  000	   13	  573	  000	  
LUNDBERGFORETAGEN	   25	  172	  000	   10	  067	  000	   85	  226	  000	  
LUNDIN	  PETROLEUM	   52	  625	  928	   2	  150	  866	   18	  449	  330	  
MEDA	   21	  640	  603	   14	  937	  000	   38	  152	  000	  
MELKER	  SCHORLING	   16	  866	  560	   1	  327	  000	   19	  368	  000	  
MILLICOM	  INT.	   68	  900	  690	   19	  184	  865	   47	  850	  469	  
MODERN	  TIMES	  GP.	   21	  833	  384	   619	  000	   11	  217	  000	  
NCC	   13	  120	  734	   -­‐5	  725	  000	   32	  733	  000	  
NIBE	  INDUSTRIER	   11	  196	  513	   2	  128	  700	   11	  655	  300	  
	   MVE	   DEBT	   TA	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ORIFLAME	  COSMETICS	   12	  355	  676	   294	  562	   7	  053	  199	  
PEAB	   10	  117	  222	   2	  094	  000	   31	  191	  000	  
RATOS	   25	  758	  989	   10	  716	  000	   39	  305	  000	  
SAAB	   14	  455	  533	   -­‐3	  372	  000	   31	  713	  000	  
SANDVIK	   100	  181	  952	   1	  608	  000	   95	  669	  000	  
SCA	   71	  638	  934	   24	  554	  000	   138	  289	  000	  
SCANIA	   81	  600	  000	   10	  574	  000	   108	  058	  000	  
SECURITAS	   21	  684	  498	   8	  460	  100	   35	  155	  300	  
SKANSKA	   46	  920	  116	   -­‐5	  793	  000	   81	  099	  000	  
SKF	   66	  299	  116	   -­‐7	  608	  000	   58	  075	  000	  
SSAB	   19	  646	  644	   5	  871	  000	   62	  737	  000	  
SWEDISH	  MATCH	   49	  879	  254	   7	  685	  000	   13	  729	  000	  
TELE2	   59	  471	  680	   13	  695	  000	   43	  623	  000	  
TELIASONERA	   202	  518	  065	   66	  207	  000	   245	  808	  000	  
TIETO	  CORPORATION	   6	  996	  201	   194	  892	   10	  950	  417	  
TRELLEBORG	   16	  196	  539	   3	  070	  000	   27	  760	  000	  
WALLENSTAM	   10	  909	  300	   15	  388	  000	   28	  967	  000	  
VOLVO	   152	  665	  325	   237	  360	  954	   340	  406	  000	  
Appendix C Table 3 – Overview of data for Tobin’s q calculations. All numbers 
are expressed in SEK thousands.  
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Tobin’s q, Dependent Variable, RMI and RMT 
	   q	   ln(q)	   RMI	   RMT	  
ABB	  (OME)	   0.9889	   -­‐0.0111	   75	   1376	  
ALFA	  LAVAL	   1.6601	   0.5069	   75	   1228	  
ALLIANCE	  OIL	  SDB	   0.7728	   -­‐0.2577	   62	   698	  
ASSA	  ABLOY	   1.3447	   0.2961	   80	   1120	  
ASTRAZENECA	  (OME)	   1.1552	   0.1443	   84	   2190	  
ATLAS	  COPCO	   2.3567	   0.8573	   83	   1952	  
ATRIUM	  LJUNGBERG	   0.8412	   -­‐0.1728	   52	   614	  
AXFOOD	   1.6666	   0.5107	   72	   1070	  
AXIS	   5.5240	   1.7091	   62	   671	  
BILLERUD	   0.5299	   -­‐0.6350	   65	   1011	  
BOLIDEN	   0.7478	   -­‐0.2905	   69	   1126	  
ELECTROLUX	   0.4817	   -­‐0.7302	   86	   1734	  
ELEKTA	   2.8282	   1.0396	   68	   834	  
ERICSSON	   0.5517	   -­‐0.5947	   89	   1981	  
FABEGE	   0.8441	   -­‐0.1694	   59	   829	  
GETINGE	   1.2581	   0.2296	   59	   680	  
HAKON	  INVEST	   1.4804	   0.3923	   74	   979	  
HENNES	  &	  MAURITZ	   5.5810	   1.7193	   63	   662	  
HEXAGON	   1.0193	   0.0191	   68	   1037	  
HOLMEN	   0.5328	   -­‐0.6294	   57	   769	  
HUFVUDSTADEN	   0.8309	   -­‐0.1852	   50	   559	  
HUSQVARNA	   0.6271	   -­‐0.4665	   87	   1364	  
INDUSTRIVARDEN	   0.8579	   -­‐0.1532	   54	   456	  
INVESTOR	   0.6174	   -­‐0.4821	   81	   2558	  
KINNEVIK	   0.6061	   -­‐0.5006	   54	   610	  
LATOUR	  INVESTMENT	   1.2237	   0.2019	   63	   748	  
LUNDBERGFORETAGEN	   0.4134	   -­‐0.8831	   65	   967	  
LUNDIN	  PETROLEUM	   2.9690	   1.0882	   76	   1033	  
MEDA	   0.9587	   -­‐0.0421	   67	   824	  
MELKER	  SCHORLING	   0.9393	   -­‐0.0625	   45	   379	  
MILLICOM	  INT.	   1.8408	   0.6102	   50	   765	  
MODERN	  TIMES	  GP.	   2.0016	   0.6939	   67	   1185	  
NCC	   0.2259	   -­‐1.4874	   69	   1244	  
NIBE	  INDUSTRIER	   1.1432	   0.1338	   52	   673	  
ORIFLAME	  COSMETICS	   1.7935	   0.5841	   69	   974	  
PEAB	   0.3914	   -­‐0.9377	   61	   1030	  
RATOS	   0.9279	   -­‐0.0747	   70	   1252	  
SAAB	   0.3494	   -­‐1.0512	   76	   1632	  
SANDVIK	   1.0639	   0.0620	   67	   931	  
SCA	   0.6955	   -­‐0.3629	   78	   1678	  
SCANIA	   0.8530	   -­‐0.1589	   76	   1613	  
SECURITAS	   0.8574	   -­‐0.1537	   72	   1061	  
SKANSKA	   0.5071	   -­‐0.6790	   72	   2133	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   q	   ln(q)	   RMI	   RMT	  
SKF	   1.0106	   0.0105	   79	   1444	  
SSAB	   0.4067	   -­‐0.8995	   71	   1350	  
SWEDISH	  MATCH	   4.1928	   1.4333	   72	   1014	  
TELE2	   1.6772	   0.5171	   61	   728	  
TELIASONERA	   1.0932	   0.0891	   79	   1959	  
TIETO	  CORPORATION	   0.6566	   -­‐0.4205	   77	   1193	  
TRELLEBORG	   0.6940	   -­‐0.3652	   81	   1699	  
WALLENSTAM	   0.9078	   -­‐0.0966	   75	   1595	  
VOLVO	   1.1457	   0.1360	   62	   740	  
Appendix C Table 4 – Overview of Tobin’s q, ln(q), RMI and RMT 
 
 
